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SUMMARY 
Six months after the 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake, a Mw 6.2 Christchurch 
(Lyttelton) aftershock struck Christchurch on the 22 February 2011. This earthquake was centred 
approximately 10km south-east of the Christchurch CBD at a shallow depth of 5km, resulting in intense 
seismic shaking within the Christchurch central business district (CBD). Unlike the 4 Sept earthquake 
when limited-to-moderate damage was observed in engineered reinforced concrete (RC) buildings [35], 
in the 22 February event a high number of RC Buildings in the Christchurch CBD (16.2 % out of 833) 
were severely damaged. There were 182 fatalities, 135 of which were the unfortunate consequences of 
the complete collapse of two mid-rise RC buildings. 
This paper describes immediate observations of damage to RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 
Christchurch earthquake. Some preliminary lessons are highlighted and discussed in light of the 
observed performance of the RC building stock. Damage statistics and typical damage patterns are 
presented for various configurations and lateral resisting systems. Data was collated predominantly from 
first-hand post-earthquake reconnaissance observations by the authors, complemented with detailed 
assessment of the structural drawings of critical buildings and the observed behaviour.  
Overall, the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake was a particularly severe test for both 
modern seismically-designed and existing non-ductile RC buildings. The sequence of earthquakes since 
the 4 Sept 2010, particularly the 22 Feb event has confirmed old lessons and brought to life new critical 
ones, highlighting some urgent action required to remedy structural deficiencies in both existing and 
“modern” buildings. Given the major social and economic impact of the earthquakes to a country with 
strong seismic engineering tradition, no doubt some aspects of the seismic design will be improved based 
on the lessons from Christchurch. The bar needs to and can be raised, starting with a strong endorsement 
of new damage-resisting, whilst cost-efficient, technologies as well as the strict enforcement, including 
financial incentives, of active policies for the seismic retrofit of existing buildings at a national scale. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General 
Six months after the 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield 
(Canterbury) earthquake, the Mw 6.2 Christchurch (Lyttelton) 
earthquake struck Christchurch on the 22 February 2011. The 
Mw 6.2 was centred approximately 10km south-east of the 
Christchurch central business district (CBD) at a shallow 
depth of 5km, resulting in intense seismic shaking within the 
Christchurch CBD.  
Unlike the 4 Sept earthquake event, when limited-to-moderate 
damage was observed in engineered reinforced concrete (RC) 
buildings [35], after the 22 February event about 16 % out of 
833 RC buildings in the Christchurch CBD were severely 
damaged. Whilst there was no fatality in 4 September 
earthquake (also due to the time of occurrence i.e. at 4.35am), 
there were 182 fatalities in the 22 February earthquake 
(occurring at 12.51pm), 135 of which were the unfortunate 
consequences of the complete collapse of two mid-rise RC 
buildings. 
This paper describes immediate observations of damage to RC 
buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. 
Some preliminary lessons are highlighted and discussed in 
light of the observed buildings performance. Damage statistics 
and typical damage patterns of various configurations and 
lateral resisting systems of RC construction are presented. 
Data was collated from predominantly first-hand post-
earthquake reconnaissance observations by the authors, 
complemented with detailed assessment of the structural 
drawings of critical buildings and the observed behaviour.  
1.2 RC buildings performance in the 4 September 2010 
Darfield earthquake 
The seismic performance of RC buildings in the  4 September 
2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake has been reported and 
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discussed in previous reports, published prior to the 
occurrence of the 22 February earthquake [23, 35, 59]. 
In general, RC buildings regardless of vintage performed well 
and as expected, given the shaking intensity of this event, as 
recorded in the CBD where most of the multi-storey RC 
buildings are located. No RC building collapsed during the 4 
September earthquake. For many RC buildings, no apparent 
structural damage was observed. Minor structural damage 
including column and beam flexural cracks and joint/wall 
shear cracks were observed in a number of low-to-mid-rise RC 
buildings. 
As is becoming more evident in recent earthquakes overseas, 
even when structural damage was limited or negligible the 
non-structural damage including stairway-structure 
interaction, ceilings and partitions was the main contributor of 
losses and downtime for the majority of the RC buildings.  
In the 4 September earthquake, the acceleration and 
displacement response spectral ordinates were in general 
comparable or lower than the New Zealand Loading Standards 
NZS1170.5:2004 [41] for a 500-years return period design 
level for most short periods (low-to mid-rise buildings).  
In the long period range (T=1.5s to 3.0s), the 4 September 
earthquake response spectral ordinates were generally 
exceeding the 500-years return period design level, indicating 
a moderate level of sustained damage/ductility of high-rise RC 
buildings. Beam plastic hinging, floor slab cracking and 
fracture of diaphragm topping mesh were observed in several 
high-rise buildings. Damaged emergency stairway and egress 
in high rise building was noted as a potential building health 
and safety issue (e.g. [35]). 
2 SEISMIC SHAKING INTENSITY AND RESPONSE 
SPECTRA 
2.1 Elastic acceleration response spectra 
The elastic acceleration response spectra (5%-damped) of the 
22 Feb earthquake, derived from four recorded ground 
motions in the Christchurch CBD are shown coefficient in 
Figure 1. The NZS1170:5 [41] 500-years and 2,500-years 
design spectra for Christchurch site (Z/PGA=0.22g), distance 
to nearest fault, R = 20 km and soil class D (consistent with 
the four recording sites) are also plotted in the same figure.  
It is important to note here (further discussion in the following 
paragraph briefly describing the evolution of code-provisions 
in New Zealand), that the older (1965, 1976 and 1984) code-
design coefficients have to be adjusted to become equivalent 
elastic spectra to allow for a reasonable comparison with the 
more recent NZS1170:5:2004 [41] elastic design spectra. In 
fact, a nominal ductility of four was assumed for those older 
codes. In reality, based on current knowledge, it could be 
argued that the actual ductility achievable by those structures 
(capacity) is likely to be half (approximately two) for 
buildings designed to the 1965 standard and closer to the 
assumed ductility of four for buildings designed to 1976 
standard. 
Some key observations of the response spectra in relation to 
seismic performance of reinforced concrete buildings: 
 The principal component of horizontal shaking is the 
East-West direction. This is consistent with the observed 
buildings damage in the Christchurch CBD, where 
buildings are more damaged along the East-West 
direction. 
 The East-West components were approximately 15-30% 
higher in the periods ranging from 0-2.4 s, except for the 
period range of 0.35 s-0.6 s in which the North-South 
components were stronger. 
 In general, the seismic shaking in the Christchurch CBD 
significantly exceeded the 500-year return period 
design level, typically assumed in New Zealand for the 
design of normal use (residential and commercial) 
buildings.  
 The East-West components were comparable or 
exceeded the 2,500-year return period design level in 
the period range of 0.5 s-1.75 s (approximately 5-20 
storeys RC buildings). The 2,500-year return period 
design level is typically used for the seismic design of 
post-disaster function buildings (e.g. hospitals). 
 The 2,500-year design level (approximately 
corresponding to a probability of exceedance of 2% in 
50% building life) is considered the most severe 
earthquake shaking (Maximum Considered Earthquake, 
MCE) to which a normal use building is likely to be 
subjected to, as assumed in the NZS1170:2005. At this 
level of shaking, a newly-designed building, designed to 
the minimum standards in the building code, has a small 
margin against collapse.  
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Figure 1:  22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 earthquake: Elastic 
horizontal acceleration response spectra (5%-
damped) in the Christchurch CBD and the 
NZS1170.5 design spectra (red solid) for 
Christchurch (soil class D, R = 20 km): a) 
Principal horizontal direction (East-West 
component); b) Secondary horizontal direction 
(North-South component) [34]. 
 The amplification of spectra acceleration in the 0.5 s to 
1.5 s period range and the shift of the peak spectra 
acceleration „plateau‟ is consistent with that  typically 
observed in ground motion records with forward 
directivity effects [73, 74]. The effects of such “near 
fault amplification” on building response are not fully 
understood and, more importantly, were typically not 
considered in the design of Christchurch buildings prior 
to the 22 February 2011 earthquake (caused by an 
“unknown” fault).  
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 A long period „amplification lump‟ in the 2.5 s to 3.8 s 
period range is observed in the principal East-West 
component and not in the weaker North-South 
component. This long period amplification is likely to be 
a result of the basin „slap-down‟ effect [6], as observed 
in the 4 September 2010 earthquake [13].  
The equivalent vertical spectra from NZS1170.5 [42] is 
plotted in Figure 2 with the vertical response spectra from the 
four CBD recording stations for the 22 February 
earthquake. At very short period range (0.05 s < T < 0.3 s), 
the vertical response spectra greatly exceeded the expected 
NZS1170.5 vertical design spectra.  
As it is difficult to determine the vertical stiffness of 
structures, it is hard to correlate the vertical acceleration 
demand to structural responses. However, in general terms, it 
might be expected that such a very high vertical acceleration 
can potentially amplify compression-loading on columns and 
walls, triggering axially dominated brittle failure mechanisms, 
induce higher gravity/seismic load on transfer elements and 
vertically unrestrained elements (e.g. simply-supported stair 
landing). It noted, however, that the high frequency content of 
the vertical motions resulted in the very high peak acceleration 
values only lasting for a very short duration. Further research 
is required to quantify the actual effects of high frequency 
vertical acceleration on the response of buildings subjected to 
a severe lateral loading. 
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Figure 2: 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 earthquake: Elastic 
vertical acceleration response spectra (5%-damped) in the 
Christchurch CBD and the NZS1170.5 design spectra (red 
solid) for Christchurch (soil class D, R= 20 km). 
2.2 Elastic displacement response spectra 
The lateral displacement response spectra give a better 
representation on the seismic displacement demand and thus 
provide further valuable and to some extent more reliable 
information on the likely damage to the buildings [65]. The 
5%-damped elastic pseudo-displacement response spectra for 
the four CBD recording stations are plotted in Figure 3.  
At all period ranges, both the principal and secondary 
directions horizontal shaking were higher than the 500-year 
design pseudo-displacement spectra of NZS1170.5:2004 [41].  
The elastic displacement spectra shown in Figure 3, suggests 
the seismic deformation demands for buildings with vibration 
periods (T1=  0.8 s to 1.8 s and T1= 2.9 s to 3.8 s) were 
generally very high, exceeding the NZS1170.5:2004 2500-
year pseudo-displacement design spectra. This suggests that 
in-elastically responding RC buildings between 3 to 9 storeys 
and 15 to 20 storeys would have had significant displacement 
demands and by extension, possibly significant damage.  
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Figure 3: 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 earthquake: 5%-damped 
elastic displacement response spectra of four Christchurch 
CBD records and the NZS1170.5 design spectra (red solid) 
for Christchurch (soil class D, R = 20 km): Principal 
horizontal direction (generally East-West component) [34]. 
2.3 Design spectra and inelastic response spectra 
In a typical “force-based” seismic design in New Zealand, the 
elastic 5% damped spectra will be reduced by the Ductility 
(k and the Structural Performance (Sp) factors following the 
NZS1170.5 specification. In order to compare the demand 
with the likely design-level capacity of modern building, 
Figure 4 shows the “pseudo-inelastic‟ or design acceleration 
spectra generated by reducing the individual response 
spectrum by an inelastic reduction factor corresponding to a 
ductile reinforced concrete frame structure (µ= 4 and Sp= 0.7) 
as per (Clause 5.2.1.1) in the NZS1170:5:2004.  
For comparison, the seismic loadings for “ductile” RC frames 
according to the 1984 and 1976 New Zealand Loading 
Standards (NZS 4203:1984 [49] and NZS4203:1976 [50], 
respectively) and the 1965 New Zealand Loading Standards 
(NZS1900:1965 [43]) are also plotted as red dashed lines. For 
the sake of comparison it is assumed that buildings designed to 
these older codes will achieve the full-code compliance 
ductility (assumed to be µ= 4). A ductility µ of 4 is assumed to 
be consistent with the NZS4203:1976 and the NZS1900:1965 
assumptions. Detailed retrospective comparisons of New 
Zealand loading standards have been published by Davenport 
[14] and Fenwick and MacRae [21]. 
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Figure 4: Design acceleration response spectra for the 
Christchurch (soil class D, R= 35 km, µ= 4 and Sp= 0.7) 
following the NZS1170:5:2004, NZS4203:1984 and 
NZS4203:1976. The pseudo-inelastic response spectra 
(average of 4 CBD records) for the 22 February 2011 
earthquakes (both directions) and 4 September 2010 
earthquake (principal direction) are also plotted.  
Effectively, Figure 4 compares the design lateral capacity or 
the seismic design coefficient (the lateral load capacity can be 
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obtained by multiplying this coefficient by the weight of the 
structure) for a ductile reinforced concrete frame with the 
implied „damped‟ seismic action from the 22 February 
earthquake.  
For most building periods (0.25 s < T1 < 4.0 s), both principal 
and secondary pseudo-inelastic response spectra from the 22 
February event exceeded the NZS1170.5:2004 500-year 
return-period design spectra (typical design level for normal-
use). Figure 4 implies the design force (and by extension 
ductility and displacement) demands are exceeded by 2-3 
times even for ductile reinforced concrete buildings designed 
to the NZS1170:5:2004 Loading Standards, 
Between building periods of 0.5 s to 1.8 s and 2.8 s to 3.5 s, 
the seismic demands (in acceleration/forces) from the 22 
February 2011 earthquakes were close to or above the 
NZS1170.5:2004 2,500-year return-period design spectra. In 
particular, these two „amplification lumps‟ in the principal 
direction of the 22 February 2011 motion,  indicate significant 
inelastic demand on structures with effective periods within 
these range (e.g. base isolation, flexible structures). 
Interestingly, the older NZS4203 (1976 and 1984) and 
NZS1900 seismic coefficients are generally lower in the short 
periods (T1< 0.6 s) and higher in the long periods (T1> 1.4 s-
1.6 s) when compared with the NZS1170.5 design spectra for 
a similarly ductile RC frame. On the other hand, it should be 
emphasised that while the seismic design acceleration/forces 
are discussed herein, the ductile detailing and other design 
aspects have significantly improved over time, resulting in a 
higher likelihood to achieve the assumed ductility (capacity to 
displace in the inelastic range) implied in the loading 
standards.  
Figure 5 shows design level versus demand within an 
Acceleration-Displacement Response Spectrum (ADRS) 
domain (commonly used in seismic assessment procedures). 
In such domain, the building periods are plotted on radial 
lines. It can be observed that from an acceleration and 
displacement demand perspective, the 22 February event 
greatly exceeded the 500-year design level in most period 
ranges, and significantly exceeded the 2,500-year design level 
at several period ranges.  
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Figure 5: 22 February 2011 6.2 Mw earthquake: Inelastic 
Acceleration-Displacement Response Spectrum (ADRS) 
(principal horizontal direction) for the four Christchurch 
CBD records and the NZS1170:5 design spectra (red solid) 
for Christchurch (soil class D, R= 20 km, µ= 4 and Sp= 0.7). 
2.4 Remarks on seismic shaking intensity of the 22 
February 2011 versus 4 September 2010 
earthquakes 
As observed in the comparison of pseudo-inelastic 
acceleration spectra in Figure 4, the ground shaking intensity, 
in terms of the seismic acceleration response spectra in the 
Christchurch CBD was about two to three times higher in the 
22 February 2011 6.2 Mw earthquake when compared to the 4 
September 2010 7.1 Mw earthquake.  
In a more general contextual report, Kam and Pampanin [34] 
provides a more thorough discussion of the response spectra of 
the 22 February 2011 earthquake, in comparison with the 4 
September 2010 and 26 December 2010 earthquakes.  
Preliminary seismological investigation indicates the complex 
seismic wave interaction at the deep alluvial soils underlying 
Christchurch („basin effect‟), the shallowness of the rupture 
and the directivity effects from the oblique-reverse fault 
rupture mechanism resulted in severe ground shaking within 
the Christchurch CBD [13, 22, 27]. 
Fundamentally, the occurrence of the 22 February 2011 and 4 
September 2010 earthquakes and their impacts clearly 
confirmed the high dependency of the seismic performance of 
the structures to the peculiar characteristics of the ground 
shaking of the site (not simply limited to peak-ground 
acceleration or earthquake magnitude)  
From the seismic design perspective, whilst the 22 February 
event is said to be a very rare event (in the order of 1 in 10,000 
years [28]), it is apparent that a seismic design loading purely 
based on a uniform hazard spectra derived from a probabilistic 
seismic hazard model (e.g. NZS1170.5:2004) may lead to a 
very un-conservative and highly undesirable design outcome. 
Preliminary SESOC observations [72] indicate that a higher 
seismic design load has negligible cost impact on new 
buildings.  
The seismic Hazard Factor ((NZS1170:5)[41] Z factor) for 
Christchurch and Canterbury region was elevated from 0.22 to 
0.3 in May 2011, in view of the clustering effect of the seismic 
activity [16, 25].  
A University of Canterbury Structural Group report [10] 
commissioned by the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal 
Commission recommended a dual approach to raise the bar of 
seismic resilience of structures: on one hand increasing the 
seismicity; on the other supporting the wide implementation of 
new technologies for damage-resistant systems, which can 
have comparable if not lower costs than traditional solutions . 
3 REINFORCED CONCRETE BUILDING STOCK IN 
CHRISTCHURCH CBD 
3.1 Reinforced Concrete Buildings Distribution and 
Types in the Christchurch CBD 
Christchurch CBD is defined by the grid road network 
bounded by the four avenues (Deans, Bealey, Fitzgerald and 
Moorhouse). Christchurch CBD consists of predominantly 
commercial and light-industrial buildings (58%) but also 
contained significant number of residential buildings (42%), 
particularly towards the north and east edges of the CBD.  
The majority (~81%) of the buildings (of all construction 
types) in the Christchurch CBD were of one to two storeys 
buildings. There were 127 buildings of at least six-storeys, 
with the tallest RC building being 22-storeys (86 metres).  
RC frames and RC walls are the most common multi-storey 
construction types. Out of 175 buildings with 5- or more 
storeys, 51.5% are RC frame buildings, 25% are RC wall 
buildings, 13% are reinforced concrete masonry (RCM) and 
6% are RC frame with infills. Only 9 steel structures with 5- 
or more storeys were observed in the CBD.  
RC building construction began to flourish after the Hawke‟s 
Bay 1931 Mw 7.9 earthquake and the associated decline of 
unreinforced masonry (URM) construction. Many of the mid-
rise and high-rise reinforced concrete buildings in 
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Christchurch were built during the construction booms in the 
1960s and 1980s. Figure 6 illustrates some of the notable mid- 
and high-rise buildings in the Christchurch CBD in 1978 and 
1990. 
Buildings constructed prior to the introduction of modern 
seismic codes in the mid-1970s are still prevalent in the 
Christchurch CBD. Approximately 45% of the total CBD 
building stock were built prior to the 1970s. Of this, 13.8% or 
188 pre-1970s buildings are 3-storeys and more, resulting in 
significant life safety risk in the event of collapse. Assessing 
and mitigating these potentially significant-collapse buildings 
is an internationally-recognised key priority of seismic risk 
mitigation.  
Precast concrete floor systems began to be used for multi-
storey RC buildings in New Zealand from the mid-1960s 
onwards. From the 1980s to present, the majority of multi-
storey RC buildings use precast concrete floors or concrete 
composite steel deck systems. Similarly ductile precast 
concrete emulative (to cast-in-place approach by wet 
connections) frames construction was introduced in the early 
1980s and soon became the most popular form of construction 
for RC frames.  
RC shear walls, coupled-walls and dual frame-wall systems 
were also widely used in New Zealand from the 1970s 
onwards, driven by the design guidance from the research of 
Professors Park and Paulay at the University of Canterbury.  
3.2 Reinforced Concrete Buildings Building Safety 
Emergency Placard / Damage Statistics 
As with the 4 Sept earthquake, emergency response teams of 
structural engineers carried out the Building Safety Evaluation 
(BSE) procedure (i.e., coloured-placard tagging [53]) under 
the Civil Defence state of emergency authority.  
While the building BSE tagging status is not a direct 
representative of damage, it is the best-available indicator of 
observed damage in a systematic format and based on a fast 
visual screening (exterior and interior only. Due to the rapid 
nature of the BSE screening for immediate risk, the tagging 
damage data should be interpreted with some care depending 
on the final purpose of the study. Further detailed damage and 
seismic assessment, based on structural/construction drawings 
and material properties, is required to establish and confirm 
the structural integrity of the buildings and arrive at more 
reliable statistics of damage.  
Figure 7 and Figure 8 summarise the key statistics and 
findings from the processed BSE building database. The 
breakdown of the BSE placard statistics according to the type 
of building construction and year of construction is presented 
in Figure 8. For completeness, the statistics for all building 
types is also presented in Figure 8. 
There are at least 3000 buildings within the Christchurch CBD 
(based on the 12 June 2011 CCC Building Safety Evaluation 
(BSE) statistics). As per 12 June 2011 (a day before the 13 
June Mw 5.5 and 6.0 aftershocks), 53% of these were assessed 
as “Green – No restriction on use or occupancy”, 23% as 
“Yellow - Restricted Use” and 24% as “Red – Unsafe”.  
As per 12 June 2011, 66% to 70% of “Green” and “Red” 
tagged buildings have had only a Level 1 rapid exterior 
inspection. As there is no current legislative requirement for 
Level 2 assessments or detailed post-earthquake seismic 
assessment for all the building stock (especially for green-
tagged buildings), it is hard to ascertain whether the damage 
statistic is completely accurate. Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority (CERA) and CCC are currently 
developing requirements and technical guidelines for detailed 
post-earthquake seismic assessment [1]. 
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Figure 6:  Notable mid- and high-rise buildings in Christchurch CBD in 1978 and 1990 [56]. Photo sketches are courtesy of 
CCC Library.  
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Figure 7: Distribution of buildings tagging statistics in Christchurch CBD. Building tagging is based on the 
CCC/Civil Defence Building Safety Evaluation procedure. (Statistics data is updated to 12 June 2011) 
[34]. 
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Figure 8:  Distribution of Building Safety Evaluation placards of all buildings in the Christchurch CBD as per 12 June 2011 
(source: CCC). The data is categorised into building construction age and the primary structural system (adapted 
from the CCC database, Civil Defence BSE data and authors‟ field inspection). The shaded bar on the secondary 
vertical axis shows the total number of buildings in each building construction age. 
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24% of all CBD buildings are Red-tagged and 23% are 
yellow-tagged. This represents over 1,400 buildings out of 
approximately 3,000 building stock in the CBD (in the 
available record). In a previous CERA estimation, up to 1,300 
buildings may be demolished [31]. 
Table 1 summarises the distribution of BSE tagging of the 833 
inspected RC buildings within the Christchurch CBD area as 
of 12 June 2011. The placard distribution for the 717 RC 
buildings inspected within the Christchurch City Council 
(CCC) boundary after the 4 September event is shown in 
reference [35].  
Table 1. Distribution of Building Safety Evaluation 
placards of all RC buildings in the Christchurch 
CBD as per 12 June 2011 (source: CCC). 
Green Yellow Red
Reinforced Concrete (RC) Frames 179 (50.1%) 102 (28.6%) 76 (21.3%)
RC Shear Wall 44 (48.4%) 29 (31.9%) 18 (19.8%)
RC Frames With Masonry Infill 98 (46.9%) 86 (41.1%) 25 (12%)
Tilt Up Concrete 120 (68.2%) 40 (22.7%) 16 (9.1%)
Types of Constructions
NZSEE Building Safety Evaluation Tagging
 
Evidently, the statistics indicate a significantly higher number 
of Yellow and Red-tagged buildings in the 22 February 
earthquake, when compared with the 4 September earthquake 
where nearly 90% of all RC buildings inspected were given a 
Green tag [35].  
There is a consistent trend of higher observed damage or 
proportion of yellow/red tagged buildings constructed prior to 
the 1970s, for all construction types. More than 54% of the 
pre-1970s RC buildings (RC frames, walls, infilled frames or 
tilt-up walls) were tagged as Yellow or Red. In comparison, 
about 44% of the post-1970s RC buildings were tagged as 
Yellow or Red. While the percentage of severely damaged 
1970s RC buildings was expected, the higher-than-expected 
percentage of post-1970s RC buildings damaged (or Yellow 
and Red-tagged buildings) was somewhat unexpected 
considering the improvements in the seismic provisions. 
The introduction of modern seismic codes in the 1970s also 
led to the significant decline of reinforced concrete infill 
frames buildings. Unreinforced masonry (URM) construction 
was in general ceased after the 1931 Hawkes Bay earthquake. 
4 GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF PRE-1970 RC 
BUILDINGS BUILT  
In the following discussion, the classification “pre-1970s” and 
“modern buildings” refers to buildings designed prior-to and 
after the 1976 “modern” seismic code NZS4203:1976 [49] 
respectively. 
Without explicit design for lateral-force resistance, ductile 
detailing and capacity-design concepts, for example, buildings 
constructed prior to NZS4203:1976 and NZS3101 concrete 
codes [45, 46] provisions generally have inadequate seismic 
capacity and brittle failure modes.  
Typical structural deficiencies of pre-1970s RC buildings are: 
a) Lack of confining stirrups in walls, joints and columns; b) 
Inadequate reinforcing and anchorage details; c) Poor material 
properties and use of plain reinforcing bars; d) No capacity 
design principles‟; e) Irregular configuration. 
4.1 Pre-1970s RC frames-walls buildings 
The seismic vulnerability and the non-ductile behaviour of 
pre-1970s RC frame buildings are well documented based on 
past research and observation in recent earthquakes [52, 54, 
61]. Based on the BSE tagging statistics, up to 57% of pre-
1970s RC frame buildings were either yellow or red-tagged 
(see Figure 8).  
The catastrophic total collapse of the Pyne Gould Corp 
building (1960s RC frame/wall structure) draws a significant 
attention to the high vulnerability of pre-1970s RC buildings. 
Considering the total catastrophic collapse of the Pyne Gould 
Corp building (see Section 6.1), the wide variability of the 
seismic performance of these buildings will require further 
studies.  
The poor seismic behaviour of these buildings is as expected. 
In many buildings, the presence of plan and vertical 
eccentricity and torsional amplification intensified the seismic 
displacement and force demands on non-ductile RC elements.  
Plan irregularity and column shear failure: Figure 9 and 
Figure 10 show a 4-storey 1950s RC frame-wall building with 
severe columns damage on the Northern frame. The building 
is reinforced with plain round bars. As seen in Figure 10, the 
columns, which failed in shear, have almost negligible 
transverse reinforcement.  
 
Figure 9: Plan stiffness eccentricity due to stiff infill frame 
and internal RC „non-structural‟ RC walls.  
 
 
Figure 10:   Severe column shear failures of the front 
(North) façade frame of a 4-storey RC frame-wall building.  
North 
Stiff infill frame on the South elevation 
Severely damaged 
RC columns 
RC walls 
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Excessive shear demand was imposed on these columns on the 
Northern frame due to the plan stiffness eccentricity of the 
building. The plan eccentricity was a consequence of the stiff 
infilled RC frame and RC core walls at the South end of the 
building, resulting in torsional demand on the Northern frame 
due to East-West seismic shaking 
Foundation beam, coupling wall and joint shear failure: 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show a 5-storey RC frame-wall 
building with multiple elements failing in brittle behaviour. It 
comprises six one-way RC frames in the North-South 
direction and several coupled- and single RC walls acting 
predominantly in the East-West direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Pre-1970s RC frames-walls building with 
multiple elements experiencing a brittle 
failure mode. 
The lateral resisting system in the East-West direction appears 
to be severely damaged. The coupled walls in the internal grid 
line had severe damage on its coupling beams at the lower 
three storeys (Figure 12c). The coupling beams are lightly-
reinforced with plain round bars. The foundation underneath 
the core walls around the lift-shaft appears to have failed and 
dropped approximately 400 mm (Figure 12b). One of the 
foundation ground beams was observed to have failed in shear 
with evidence of liquefaction observed in the vicinity of the 
foundation beams (Figure 12d).  
It is likely that the RC frames resisted a significant portion of 
the lateral load in the North-South direction and torsional load 
from the East-West shaking. The failure of the walls system 
and foundation beam in the East-West direction and the 
vertical drop of these core walls also „dragged‟ the RC frames 
inward, resulted in shear-failure of the beam-column joints as 
the frames deformed inwards. The unreinforced beam-column 
joints developed the highly brittle shear-wedge mechanism.  
The building subsequently collapsed in an aftershock on 13 
June 2011.  
Short column and joint shear damage of an early 1970s 
building: Figure 13 shows an 8-storey 1973 building of two-
way RC frames with a C-shaped core-wall structural system. 
Typical 457 mm square columns are reinforced with 12 
distributed D28 (28 mm diameter deformed) longitudinal bars 
and D10 stirrups at 230 mm centres. The beam-column joints 
are reinforced with 1-2 stirrups. The C-shape wall is 
reinforced with D10 at 200 mm centres vertically and D10 at 
250 mm centres horizontally.  
The first floor columns on the North elevation failed in shear 
with the upturned spandrel beam creating a short-column 
effect. In both Northern and Southern elevation frames, the 
beam-column joints were cracked with limited spalling. No 
apparent damage of the shear-core wall was observed.  
 
Figure 12: Pre-1970s RC frame-wall building: a) Exterior 
joint shear failure ; b) Approximate 400mm drop 
of the RC walls; c) Coupling beam failure; d) 
Shear failure of the foundation beam. 
By most accounts, this early 1970s RC building has performed 
reasonably well despite the onset of the brittle failure mode in 
the columns. The redundancy provided by the dual frame-wall 
systems ensures the building remains standing despite the 
onset of brittle failure of the East-West perimeter frames.  
The core wall did not seem to resist a significant amount of the 
seismic inertial forces. Relative minor cracks were observed 
within the core walls. The diaphragm area (~4.5 m x 2 lengths) 
tied into the core wall is limited by the voids within the core 
and the location of the walls.  
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Figure 13:  An 8-storey building with two-way RC frames 
system had a mix of column and beam-column 
joint shear failures.  
Beam lap-splice failure: Figure 14 illustrates the typical 
damage sustained by a 5-storey 1967 RC frame building (plan 
view shown in Figure 15). The building comprises six two-bay 
RC frames in the East-West direction and three five-bay RC 
frames in the North-South direction.  
The tower structure on the West side, seismically isolated 
from the frame building, was tilting 120 mm east due to 
ground failure. 
The majority of the 1st floor beams in the RC frames spanning 
in the East-West direction had beam lap-splice failures (Figure 
14). From structural drawings and confirmed by site 
inspection, the beam‟s 32 mm diameter longitudinal bars only 
had approximately 500 mm lap length (approximately 16db), 
with 9.5 mm diameter ties at 457 mm centres. The lap-splice 
failure-initiated cracking generally led to an inclined shear 
failure mode as the concrete shear contribution was limited.  
The base (ground floor) columns are well‐confined for 
ductility demand with 9.5 mm diameter ties at 100mm centres 
provided. At upper levels (2nd and 3rd floors), the East-West 
spanning beams had minor-to-moderate flexural cracks.  
The building further deformed significantly after the 17 April 
2011 5.3 Mw aftershock, with a near soft-storey collapse at the 
ground floor, leading to an urgent demolition order. This 
building illustrates how a simple critical deficiency such as 
beam lap-splice failure can lead to catastrophic building 
failure and soft-storey collapse.  
 
  
Figure 14: Ground floor beam lap-splice failure. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: 5-storey RC frame building built in 1967 with 
beam lap-splice failure.  
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4.2 Pre-1970s RC walls 
Pre-1970s RC walls are generally very lightly reinforced and 
are prone to shear-failure and compressive buckling failure. 
One or two layer of 9.5 mm (3/8”) diameter bar at 305 mm 
(12”) centres is the typical horizontal and vertical 
reinforcement provided for a typical 150 mm to 200  mm (6” 
to 8”) thick wall. 
Prior to the NZS3101:1982, walls were not detailed for 
ductility with inadequate horizontal and vertical reinforcement 
at critical regions of the walls. In particular, the older type 
walls generally have no adequate reinforcement to provide 
confinement to the concrete and buckling restraint to the 
longitudinal reinforcement.  
Nevertheless, some older RC walls buildings with significant 
structural redundancy and thicker wall sections appeared to 
perform satisfactorily. However, as to be discussed for the 
Pyne Gould Corp (PGC) building in Section 6.1, when the 
lightly-reinforced RC core wall is the only lateral-load 
resisting element and the “gravity” frames are not capable of 
sustaining moderate to high drift demands, the building can be 
susceptible to catastrophic collapse. 
Expected wall shear and flexural failure: Figure 16 illustrates 
the typical shear-type and flexural-type failure of long lightly-
reinforced RC walls in pre-1970s low-rise to mid-rise 
building.  
Figure 16a shows the ground-floor section of RC walls of a 5-
storey building with multiple cantilevered walls and coupled-
walls as its lateral-load resisting system. While shear cracks 
have been initiated, the building has significant residual lateral 
strength, owing to the multiple redundancy and relatively thick 
walls.   
Figure 16b shows one of four East-West RC walls with 
flexural failure at the 3rd floor of a 9-storey building built in 
1964-65. The RC walls are bounded with concrete-encased 
steel columns. The remainder of the building structure 
comprises two-way steel frames (possibly moment-resisting 
frames) providing some lateral stability despite the failure of 
the shear walls. The vertical irregularity due to the one-bay 
setback at the 2nd floor resulted in the concentrated shear 
damage observed at the 3rd floor. 
At the vicinity of the cracked and spalled concrete, the vertical 
plain reinforcement and the flange-plate of the steel columns 
were buckled. The inadequate bond capacity of plain-round 
bars after flexural-cracking resulted in one discrete 
crack/failure plane with significant inelastic strain demand on 
the exposed reinforcement.  
  
Figure 16: Typical shear and flexural failure of RC walls in 
buildings built prior to the 1970s.  
 
Boundary zone crushing and bar buckling –Figure 17 shows 
bar buckling and crushing of wall boundary zones with light 
longitudinal reinforcement and confinement. The 8-storeys 
building designed in 1967 has four similar walls located at the 
four corners, all oriented in the E-W direction. The walls are 
roughly 4 m long and 230 mm thick, with a one-sided flange 
extending approximately 750 mm from the web at one end. 
This flange is terminated at the ground floor level and 
crushing is observed in all 4 walls at the top of the basement 
level immediately below the termination of the flange.  
Bar buckling was observed on the opposite end of the wall 
where concrete spalling exposed the wide spacing of 
transverse reinforcement.  Large displacement demands due to 
crushing at the wall base resulted in severe damage to the slab 
adjacent to the damaged wall in most of the upper stories and 
shear failure of the coupling beam at the 7th level.  
 
   
Figure 17: Wall boundary compression zone crushing and 
buckling failure. 
Compression zone failure: Figure 17 above and Figure 18 
below illustrate typical compression-zone failure of RC walls 
with irregular section shape. As these pre-1970s walls were 
lightly reinforced with almost no cross ties or confining 
reinforcement at critical compression section, the compression 
zone concrete cracked and spalled under a low level of 
shaking. The subsequent seismic loading cycles thus led to the 
buckling and/or fracture of the wall longitudinal reinforcing.  
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Figure 18: Compression zone failure of pre-1970s RC 
walls. Photo is taken from the ground floor 
wall of an early 1960s 9-storey RC building.  
Coupling-beams shear failure: RC coupled-walls were a 
developing ductile seismic structural form in the 1960s with 
various different detailing practices used to transfer the 
significant shear across the coupling spandrel beams. Figure 
19 shows a 9-storey office building designed and built circa 
1965, with significant damage to its RC coupled-wall 
elements.  
The RC core walls (coupled walls and C-shaped walls) on the 
Southern elevation provide the main lateral-load resisting 
system, with a two-bay gravity steel frame on the Northern 
elevation spanning in the East-West direction. The torsional 
eccentricity is resisted by the coupled-walls in the North-
South direction (Figure 19b-d). Despite its vintage, the 
coupling beams have diagonal and horizontal deformed 
reinforcement. No confining vertical ties however are 
provided in the coupling elements, leading to substantial 
concrete spalling after shear failure.  
The coupling beams of the main lateral structural elements in 
the East-West direction were severely damaged at the 3rd and 
4th floors (see Figure 19e). At the 1st to 2nd floors and 5th to 6th 
floors, the coupling beams damage was less severe. The 
vertical damage distribution indicates a strong contribution 
from the second mode of vibration for the building.  
The staircases, which were within the confined RC core walls, 
were also severely damaged at their supports, particularly at 
the upper floors (beyond the 4th floor). The stairs were 
supported on three „pinned‟ connections with no allowance for 
movement. The bottom connection, consisting of a steel fixing 
bolted into in-situ concrete (with an apparent compressible 
material) was severely damaged (see Figure 62c).  
Lack of load path and adequate connection between 
diaphragm and wall: 
In several buildings, the lack of damage to some RC walls 
despite the apparent deformation demand on the remainder of 
the buildings suggests that the load path from, and connection 
to the floor diaphragm to the walls was poor and limited.  
The 8-storey RC wall building shown in Figure 17 is an 
example of this. While four of the L-shaped RC walls in the 
East-West direction were damaged, the internal RC walls (also 
spanning in the East-West direction) shows a limited level of 
distress. The presence of voids (from services, lift and 
staircase penetrations) and limited diaphragm ties into the 
walls means limited inertia forces were transferred into these 
walls, despite being „stiffer‟ than the L-shaped walls.  
As will be discussed in Sections 5.2 and 6, the poor load path 
between diaphragm and wall is not limited to pre-1970s walls. 
The lack of integral and robust diaphragm-to-walls load paths, 
combined with several other factors can be catastrophic, and 
may have contributed to the collapse of the CTV building. 
 
  
  
 
Figure 19:  a) Seven-storey 1960s coupled-RC walls building 
with significant damage on the coupling beams. b) Shear 
walls damaged at East elevation; c-d) Coupled-wall 
damage at the West elevation; e) Damaged coupling 
beam at the internal coupled-walls (East-West direction). 
4.3 Reinforced concrete frames with infills 
RC frames with masonry infill buildings can be a particularly 
vulnerably class of buildings, evident from the experience of 
overseas earthquakes. These buildings are also relatively 
common in New Zealand from the early 1920s to the mid-
1960s, owing to the masonry infill perceived function as 
acoustic and fire boundaries. Therefore, the masonry infill 
panels along the building length usually have no openings, 
while the building frontage and rear elevation infill walls will 
generally have extensive window penetrations. 
Masonry infill walls prior to the 1950s were generally 
unreinforced masonry clay bricks, with no seismic separation 
provided between the frames and the infill bricks. From the 
(a) North-East elevation 
(b) East-elevation wall 
(N-S direction) 
(c) West-elevation coupled-
wall (N-S direction) 
(d) West-elevation coupled-
wall (N-S direction) 
(e) Primary coupled-wall‟s 
coupling beam (E-W 
direction) at 3rd floor 
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mid-1960s, seismic gaps between the infill walls and frames 
were typically used [44]. The choice of infill masonry also 
gradually switched from unreinforced clay bricks to lightly 
reinforced concrete block masonry.  
The seismic behaviour of moment-resisting frames with full or 
partial height masonry infill is very complex. If the walls are 
not separated from the frames, the infilled frames can behave 
almost like a shear wall (e.g. Figure 10) up to the premature 
brittle failure of the infill material. From there onwards brittle 
mechanisms can develop both at local (captive or short 
columns e.g. Figure 20) or global level (soft-storey).  
Few cases of severe damage of infill frames were observed in 
Christchurch after the 22 Feb earthquake. Notably, one three-
storey RC frame building with masonry infill building 
collapsed after the 13 June 2011 Mw 6.2 aftershock (Figure 
20). The building in Figure 20 had localised damage such as 
short-column shear failure due to partial height infills and 
joint/column shear cracking after the 22 February event. 
However, with subsequent aftershocks and the cumulative 
strength degradation of the masonry infill walls and RC 
frames, the central portion of the building collapsed in the 13 
June aftershock.  
 
Figure 20: Reinforced concrete frame buildings 
collapse/damage patterns: Pre-1930s three-storey RC 
frame with masonry infill a) Survived the 22 February 
2011 Mw 6.2 earthquake; b) Collapsed after the 13th 
June Mw 6.0 aftershock; insert: short column failure. 
RC frames with masonry infill walls, both unreinforced and 
reinforced, are generally very stiff, with the participation of 
infill walls can provide a lateral over-strength capacity as high 
as 1.5 to 2.5 times that of bare RC frame (e.g. [2]).  
However, the effects of interaction between infill walls and 
RC frames can be both positive and detrimental. Masonry 
infill walls can increase the stiffness and strength of the bare 
frame structure, allowing it to survive a certain level of 
earthquake shaking with an almost elastic behaviour. As 
observed for the building in Figure 20, further cycles of strong 
aftershocks can cause severe damage in the infill walls, 
leading to sudden reduction of stiffness at a storey level, thus 
easily resulting in a soft-storey mechanism and/or pronounced 
inelastic torsional effects. 
Figure 21 shows the flexural-shear failure of a RC masonry 
infill wall, which acts as both infill wall and lateral-load 
resisting element. The building is a two-storey rectangular 
shape building with RC frames in the transverse direction and 
RC infilled-frames in the longitudinal (East-West) direction. 
As seen on Figure 21, the infill wall is heavily reinforced 
vertically for flexure but is lightly reinforced for shear.  
   
Figure 21: Flexural-shear damage of a RC masonry infill 
wall within two-storey RC frames. 
4.4 Reinforced Concrete Masonry (RCM) 
Reinforced Concrete Masonry (RCM) is a construction 
material/technique that was introduced in the early 1950s and 
popularized in the 1960s. In particular, Christchurch pioneered 
the use of RCM walls as seismic resisting system for mid-rise 
buildings in New Zealand.  
With the introduction of the New Zealand masonry code in the 
1960s [44], the material quality and masonry workmanship 
were perceived to have significantly improved. In 
Christchurch, mid-rise residential buildings up to 6-storey 
were built using RC block masonry. Figure 22 shows some 
typical detailing of RCM lateral and gravity load-bearing walls 
used in the 1960s.  
Typically observed deficiencies of RCM buildings are: a) Un-
grouted cell with vertical reinforcement, b) Poor anchorage of 
reinforcement and foundation/bond beams, c) Lack of or 
inadequate horizontal (shear) reinforcement, and d) poor 
concrete block material.  
 
Figure 22: Typical detailing of RCM lateral and gravity 
load-bearing walls used in New Zealand in the 
1960s (taken from [33]). The external veneer can 
be unreinforced or reinforced with no grouting. 
Figure 23 shows a 2-storey RCM residential building that 
suffered soft-storey collapse. Pull-out failure of the plain 
round reinforcement lap-connection at the base of the wall was 
likely to contribute to the collapse. An inspection of the lap-
connection (Figure 23b-c) indicates a limited starter-bar 
development length (approximately 30-35 bar diameter) was 
Longitudinal 
(East-West) 
direction 
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provided (for the plain bar reinforcing). The construction 
quality is also generally poor, with relatively porous grout 
material and evidence of rusting of the longitudinal bars. 
  
Figure 23: a) Soft-storey collapse of a 2-storey residential 
RCM building. (b-c) Anchorage pull-out failure 
of the lapped vertical reinforcement. 
Figure 24 shows one of several mid-rise RCM buildings in 
Christchurch. Extensive shear damage of the 1st floor 
transverse (East-West) walls was observed (Figure 24b and d).  
The building‟s external wall has two layers of RCM blocks, 
with the grouted vertical reinforcing (shown in Figure 22 
according to [33]). At the Northern side panel (Figure 24b), 
the failure plane was through both layers of RCM blocks. 
Some of the vertical reinforcement appeared to be 
inadequately grouted in the cells of the concrete blocks.  
The interior walls are typically single-layer RCM walls. The 
concrete blocks were heavily damaged along the shear failure 
plane at the 1st floor (Figure 24d). Few grouted cores were 
observed.  
Crushing and compressive failure of the RCM blocks was 
observed at the corner walls (e.g. Figure 24c). The poor 
grouting of the reinforcement, particularly at the outer veneer 
was evident. The damage was more extensive in the outer 
layer bricks. 
The primary deficiencies in the RCM wall systems observed 
are generally related to poor construction quality and masonry 
workmanship in specific buildings. Significant development in 
RCM design [63] and improvement in the construction 
standard [51] since the 1980s would have rectified many of 
these deficiencies. Nevertheless, since the 1980s, RCM 
construction has become less commonly used for mid-rise 
buildings due to the lack of confidence in the material and 
economic reasons. 
The damage of RCM walls for single-household residential 
dwellings, typically single-storey and not designed to the 
NZS4230 standards [51], have also been observed. These 
buildings are generally not-engineered and are built to the 
NZS4229 specification. 
 
Figure 24: Typical shear and compressive failure of 
reinforced concrete masonry walls construction.  
4.5 Heritage pre-1940s Reinforced Concrete buildings 
In the Christchurch City Council (CCC)‟s City Plan, 29 RC 
buildings are listed as Heritage Buildings [30], fourteen of 
which are between four to six storeys. Twenty-five of them 
were built prior to 1942. 
The seismic performance of these early pre-1940s RC 
buildings varied significantly, depending on the building 
typology, redundancy within the structural system, governing 
inelastic mechanism and the presence of past seismic 
strengthening.  
Figure 25 illustrates two examples of heritage pre-1940s RC 
buildings that survived the Canterbury earthquakes reasonably 
well (from preliminary exterior and internal inspections).  
(a) 
(b) (c) 
North 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(d) 
(b) (c) 
(d) 
(a) 
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Figure 25a is the four-storey Victoria Mansion, a 
predominantly RC walls building built in 1935. It consists of 
multiple RC columns, RC walls and unreinforced masonry 
(URM) infill walls, resulting in a reasonably stiff and robust 
structural system with a high degree of redundancy. 
Preliminary inspections indicate the building suffered minor 
structural damage, consisting of minor shear cracks on the RC 
wall and column elements and separation/splitting cracks of 
the URM walls.  
Figure 25b shows the 1926 National Bank (Isaac House) 
building. It comprises a two-way RC frames structure with 
multiple masonry infill walls on the perimeter and internal 
partitions. It is not known at the time of writing whether the 
building has been seismically-strengthened, but it is likely to 
have been strengthened to a degree. The regular distribution of 
reasonably robust RC lateral systems also helps the seismic 
performance of the building.  
  
Figure 25: a) 4-storey Victoria Mansion (1935), with 
RC walls or possibly RC frame with infill walls, had 
limited structural damage; (b) 4-storey RC frame/wall 
National Bank / Isaac House (1926) showed limited 
cracking and damage from preliminary inspection. 
Figure 26 and Figure 27 show two examples of older 1940s 
RC buildings which suffered significant damage to the extent 
of being demolished.  
St Elmo Court (Figure 26) is an 8-storey RC frame building 
with an internal core wall with limited capacity. The exterior 
façade consists of two layers of URM infill walls with a cavity 
gap. In the 4 September 2010 earthquake, many of the large 
panels of URM walls cracked and one ground floor column 
had diagonal shear cracking [35].  
After the 22 February 2011 aftershock, many of the exterior 
URM walls were further damaged. Several of the interior 
columns at the ground floor had limited diagonal shear cracks. 
However, the building was considered to be a soft-storey 
collapse risk as the URM walls failure within a floor can result 
in a high stiffness irregularity.  
Prior to the 22 February earthquake, conceptual seismic 
retrofit solutions using post-tensioned precast concrete or 
timber walls were considered for the damaged St Elmo 
building. However, the damage and uncertainty after the 
February event made the repair and retrofit options not viable 
and uneconomical.  
The building was amongst the first to be de-constructed in the 
Christchurch CBD, due to its proximity to the main arterial 
traffic to the Civil Defence Headquarters, Police Headquarters 
and CCC Building.  
 
Figure 26: The 8-storey St Elmo Courts (1935) suffered 
heavy masonry infill walls damage.  
  
Figure 27: The 6-storey Kenton Chambers (1929) with 
perimeter URM walls and interior RC frames. 
The 6-storey Kenton Chambers (Figure 27) built in 1929 
comprises perimeter URM load-bearing façade walls of three 
brick thicknesses and interior RC frames. It has cast-in-situ 
RC floor on a grid of RC beams supported on RC column 
(Figure 27c). Several interior ground floor columns 
experienced flexural failures with buckled longitudinal smooth 
bars observed. The Northern face perimeter walls (along the 
East-West direction) were heavily damaged, with partial 
collapse of two of the six piers. The Eastern face URM wall 
appeared to have little damage.  
5 GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF ‘MODERN’ 
POST-1976 RC BUILDINGS 
In the following discussion, “modern buildings” refer to RC 
buildings designed after the 1976 “modern” seismic loading 
standard NZS4203:1976 [49] (with capacity design principles 
East-West direction North-South 
direction 
(c) (b) 
(a) 
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introduced) and more specifically, after the introduction of the 
ductile detailing and implementation of capacity design for 
RC structures in the 1982 NZS3101 [46]. 
It should be noted that since early 1980s to the present, precast 
concrete construction, in particular in its emulative of cast-in-
place approach, is used in New Zealand for most RC frames 
(Figure 28a-b), all RC floors and to some extent RC walls 
[60]. By the means of capacity design and proper connection 
detailing of the precast concrete elements, both cast-in-situ 
monolithic and precast concrete monolithic-emulation systems 
are expected to perform similarly under earthquake shaking 
[48, 60].  
5.1 Modern (Post-1970s) RC Frame buildings 
A construction boom in the 1980s led to a large number of 
mid-to-high rise RC buildings in the Christchurch CBD, for 
which precast concrete ductile perimeter frame systems were 
widely used. Some of these high rise buildings were 
previously reported to be damaged during the 4 September 
2010 Darfield earthquake [23, 35].  
Ductile beam-hinging behaviour in cast-in-situ and precast 
cast-in-place emulation RC frames: Many of the modern RC 
moment-resisting frame buildings, generally performed well 
and exhibited moderate-to-severe ductile beam end hinging 
mechanisms commensurate with the seismic excitation (e.g. 
Figure 28c-d). Column or beam-column joint distress/damage 
was not observed in most of the modern RC frame buildings 
inspected by the authors. 
Figure 28 shows the typical beam end plastic hinging damage 
observed in a RC perimeter frames high-rise building. As with 
many high-rise RC buildings, the building‟s perimeter frames 
provide the main lateral-load resisting capacity while the more 
flexible interior frames are intended to carry mainly gravity 
loading. As observed in Figure 28, the precast concrete frames 
with wet connection outside the plastic-hinge zone behaved 
very well, with beam-hinging at the desirable locations. 
It should be noted that a number of these buildings had minor 
to moderate levels of damage in the 4 Sept 2010 earthquake 
[35]. However, the building damage was typically as expected 
from a moderately ductile response of the RC frames in the 4 
September earthquake. 
It is noteworthy that some of the mid- to high-rise RC frame 
buildings have been considered uneconomical to be repaired, 
even though they have exhibited a good ductile behaviour in a 
severe earthquake, consistent with the design expectations 
according to the current seismic code (e.g. NZS3101:2006 
[48]). Moving forward, the financial risk and damage 
acceptance of ductile RC systems may require further 
consideration.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Post-1970s RC moment-resisting frame 
buildings collapse/damage patterns: a-b) 22-storeys 
precast concrete frame building under construction; c) 
Two-way plastic hinging on 5th floor of a 22-storeys 
office tower; d) Bean plastic hinge mechanism occurred 
in both the 4 September and 22 February earthquakes.  
Beam-elongation and precast flooring unit failure: Figure 29 
and Figure 30 illustrate an extreme example in which 
extensive floor diaphragm damage with near loss of precast 
flooring unit supports occurred due to the beam elongation 
effect.  
Displacement-incompatibility of lateral load resisting systems 
and the “gravity” elements such as precast floor, gravity 
elements and transfer beams have been recognized as a critical 
structural weakness in recent research [47]. In particular, the 
adverse elongation effect from ductile plastic behaviour of 
lateral system (i.e. reinforced concrete frames) on the 
structural integrity of the diaphragm of the precast flooring 
elements is well documented [20, 39]. 
The building shown in Figure 29 and Figure 30 is a 17-storey 
building with ductile RC perimeter frames, internal gravity 
frames and flange-hung supported precast double-tee flooring. 
60mm topping with cold-drawn wire mesh reinforcement was 
used. The perimeter frames have typical 500x850 mm deep 
precast beams with 600mm square and 800 mm square 
columns. The beam spans are typically 2.9 m in the East-West 
direction and 5.8 m to 6.5 m in the North-South direction. 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
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A ductile beam hinging mechanism in the North-South 
perimeter frames was observed (and repaired) after the 4 
September 2010 earthquake. In the 22 February event, the 
beams in the East-West perimeter frames experienced hinging. 
However, as the North-South perimeter frames were 
previously hinged and softened, the torsional resistance 
expected from the overall system would have decreased. 
Consequently, the building might have a moderate level of 
torsional response (twisting clockwise on plan shown in 
Figure 29), which amplified the demand on the Northern East-
West perimeter frames.  
Due to the high beam depth-to-span ratio (850/2900), the 
beam elongation effects (geometrical elongation and plastic 
cycles cracking) were significantly more pronounced in the 
East-West perimeter frames. As expected, the elongation of 
beams created tension in the connection between the precast 
floors and supporting perimeter beams. The largest horizontal 
crack parallel to the double-tee flange support was 
approximately 20mm to 40mm wide. Slab mesh fracture was 
observed in floor topping close to the beam plastic hinges. In 
several locations at the Northern bays, the precast floors have 
dropped vertically about 10 to 20 mm, indicative of loss of 
precast floor seating support.  
Beam-elongation effects on the integrity of the diaphragm 
action of precast flooring units with brittle wire mesh as 
topping reinforcing have been identified as a critical structural 
weakness well before the 22 February earthquake [20, 39]. 
 
 
Figure 29: Ductile RC perimeter frames building with beams 
hinging, floor slab damage and collapsed precast 
staircase at upper levels (8th to 11th floor). Photo 
(b) is showing the crack repair done after the 4 
September earthquake. 
 
 
Figure 30: Extensive damage of floor diaphragm and loss of 
floor support  for building in Figure 29 due to the beam-
elongation effects of concrete frame inelastic response. 
Plan and Vertical irregularity: There are a number of 
examples of modern RC frame-wall buildings where plan and 
vertical irregularity resulted in unexpected concentration of 
seismic demands on beams, walls and columns. 
The Grand Chancellor Hotel (to be discussed in Section 6.3) is 
an example of the effects of plan and vertical irregularity on 
the overall lateral stability of the building.  
Figure 31 and Figure 32 show an example of an 11-storey RC 
frame and wall building. The lateral resisting systems (frames 
and walls) are terminated at the ground floor level with the 
ground floor slab acting as a transfer diaphragm to the 
basement perimeter walls. 175 mm thick ground floor slab was 
reinforced with high-strength 12 mm diameter bars at 300 mm 
to 350 mm centres are provided (see Figure 32c).  
 
 
Figure 31:  Schematic plan of an 11-storey building with 
plan and vertical irregularity resulting in 
severe basement columns shear-axial failure 
and transfer slab failure.  
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Figure 32: Vertical irregularity resulting in (a) severe 
basement columns shear-axial failure; (b) transfer beam 
repair and damage; c) Ground floor transfer slab failure. 
Four L-shaped 200 mm thick RC walls terminated at ground 
floor level and relied on a set of transfer beams (dashed lines 
in Figure 31) and slabs for inertia force transfer to the 150 
mm-200 m thick perimeter basement walls. The 300x500 mm 
deep transfer beams were initially damaged in the 4 September 
2010 earthquake and were repaired (see Figure 32b). 
  
The basement columns (beneath upper columns and walls) 
were designed to be ductile gravity-dominated columns with 
well-confined but flexible section. Two separate columns were 
provided to reduce the flexural stiffness of the basement 
columns (Figure 32a).  
There is also a plan stiffness irregularity, with the additional 
two sets of core walls on the Southern side. The plan 
irregularity resulted in torsional amplification and higher 
demand in the basement columns on the Northern side. Nearly 
all of the basement columns on the Northern side (first three 
gridlines) had suffered shear-axial failure (see Figure 32a). 
The basement columns under the L-shaped walls were 
severely damaged. The transfer slabs between the L-shaped 
walls and the basement perimeter walls were also heavily 
damaged (see Figure 32c). The 11-storey building was at a 
200 mm to 400 mm lateral lean (at the roof level) after the 22 
February 2011 earthquake. 
5.2 Modern (Post-1970s) RC Walls buildings 
RC structural walls, or shear wall buildings were a relatively 
popular structural system for medium to high-rise buildings 
since the 1970s.  
Perhaps due to the apparent increase in sophistication in 
design and structural analysis in recent years, a large 
percentage of the recently constructed RC walls was 
considerably thinner and more slender walls and with a 
minimum level of reinforcing and higher levels of axial load 
ratio. These walls, while detailed for flexural action, failed in 
brittle shear-compression or premature reinforcing 
tensile/compressive fracture, leading to an irreparable state of 
the buildings.  
The high number of severely damaged modern RC wall 
buildings has indicated that the current design for slender RC 
walls with inadequate confinement steel outside the confined 
boundary zone, irregular shapes, or with inter-panel grouted 
(poorly confined) lap-splice is inadequate. 
Wall web buckling - Figure 33 shows the overall buckling of 
one outstanding leg of a V-shaped (or L-shaped) shear wall in 
a 7-storeys building. The width of the buckled web was 300 
mm, with an unsupported wall height of 2.66 m, resulting in a 
height-to-thickness (slenderness) ratio of 8.9. The boundary 
zone extended approximately 1.2 m into the 4 m long web. 
The boundary steel at the damaged end of the wall consisted 
of 16-24 mm deformed bars confined by 10 mm plain round 
bars at 120 mm centres, with a 180 degree hook on every other 
longitudinal bar.  
The wall buckled over a height of approximately 1 m and 
crushing extended over 3 metres into the web. Horizontal 
cracks (approximately 1-1.5 mm width) were visible at the 
buckled end of the web, while inclined cracks in both 
directions at approximately 45 degrees were apparent in the 
middle of the web over the first storey height.  
   
 
Figure 33: Seven-storey 1980s office block with significant 
compression failure of the V-shaped RC shear 
wall. 
The damage pattern described above and shown in Figure 33 
suggests that the web may have initially experienced flexural 
tension yielding of the boundary steel, followed by buckling of 
the unsupported web over the relatively short plastic hinge 
length. The L-shaped cross-section would have resulted in a 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Photo 2 
Photo 3 
Photo 1 
Photo 1 
Photo 3 
Photo 2 
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deep compression zone with high compression strains at the 
damaged end of the web wall. Stability of the compression 
zone may have been compromised by a reduction in the web 
out-of-plane bending stiffness due to open flexural tension 
cracks from previous cycles.  
Boundary zone bar fracture – Fracture of very light 
longitudinal reinforcement was also noted in modern high-rise 
buildings. In some cases (e.g. Figure 34), wide spacing of 
transverse reinforcement may have led to bar buckling prior to 
bar fracture. Bar buckling results in high localized strains at 
the location of bar bending and can decrease the tensile strain 
capacity at fracture. The architectural design of this building 
included numerous walls, making it possible to achieve the 
higher base shear required for a low ductility (nominal or 
limited ductile) structural system and thus avoiding the need 
for full ductile detailing. 
 
Figure 34: Bar buckled and fractured in lightly reinforced 
slender RC shear wall: a) North-South Wall; b) 
East-West Wall. 
Fracture of boundary reinforcement was also observed in the 
200 mm thick wall shown in Figure 35. This 7-metre long wall 
(coupled with a 2-metre wall) was the primary E-W lateral 
force resisting system for an 8-storeys plus basement 
condominium. For the bottom four stories the wall was 
reinforced with 12 mm deformed bars at 100 mm centres in 
both directions, each face. The boundaries, extending 980 mm 
from each end, were confined with 6mm bar hoops at 60 mm 
centres, supporting at least every other longitudinal bar. 
As shown in Photo 1 of Figure 35, fracture of at least four of 
the 12mm end bars occurred at the top of the ground floor. 
Core concrete generally remained intact in the confined 
boundary zone (except where fracture of bars occurred); 
however, crushing of the core extended into the unconfined 
web for approximately 3 m from the end of the confined 
region. The crushing in the web exposed spliced transverse 
bars, which could not contain the core concrete once the cover 
had spalled (Figure 35-photo 4). The damage in the web 
extended diagonally downward from the fractured boundary, 
suggesting that high shear stresses may have also contributed 
to the observed damage.  
The building in Figure 35 also illustrates the risk of limited 
redundancy in the lateral-load resisting system. The secondary 
gravity structure, consists of light steel posts and beams, is 
unable to provide a lateral load redundant system.  
Buckling failure of ducted splice – Figure 36 shows the 
buckling failure of grouted ducted splices for precast concrete 
wall at the Ground Floor level (above a multi-level basement). 
The ducts were meant to be grouted for anti-buckling 
confinement but in some cases, inadequate grouting was 
reported. The lack of cross-ties results in limited anti-buckling 
confinement after the spalling of the concrete.  
 
Figure 36: Failure of unconfined grouted duct splice for 
longitudinal bars of precast concrete walls.  
  
  
 
Figure 35:  Boundary bar fracture and slender wall shear-axial failure in the Ground Floor of an 8-storey plus basement 
residential apartment building built in the 2000-2010.  
4 
RCM
C-shaped 
RC walls
Coupled-RC walls
Gravity steel poles & façade 
precast panels not shown Photo 1 Photo 2 
Photo 4 Photo 3 
2 
1 
3 
4 
 
257 
5.3 Precast concrete connections and systems 
Localised Corbel and Support Failure: Figure 37 shows one 
example where localised bearing failure resulted in a collapse 
of one-half of a car park floor of a 5-storey precast concrete 
building. The beam supporting the precast double-tee floor 
units fell from the supporting fin-shaped column and corbels, 
resulting in an approximately 800 mm drop of the supported 
floor. The corbel detailing may have resulted in the shear 
failure of the corbel support.  
  
Figure 37: Localised collapse and loss of gravity support at 
the 1st floor at the 5-storey car park due to corbel 
failure. 
Punching shear failure of post-tensioned slab: Post-tensioned 
concrete suspended slab are not widely used in Christchurch, 
possibly due to the negativity surrounding the post-tensioned 
slab system from the 1964 Anchorage Alaska earthquake. In 
the 22 February 2011 earthquake, a post-tensioned flat-slab on 
RC columns car park building, shown in Figure 38, pan-cake 
collapsed due to punching-shear failure of the post-tensioned 
slab. 
Punching shear failure of the 220 mm thick flat-slab on wide 
columns (approximately 1200x450 mm) can be observed at 
the South section of the collapsed building. A section of the 
building over Dundas Street, consisting of in-situ prestressed 
RC beams had also collapsed, possibly due to progressive 
collapse initiated by the punching shear failure. 
The post-tensioning in the slab did not pass through the 
columns. Forensic inspection of the collapsed columns 
suggests failure of limited continuity bars that were anchored 
into the beam-column joint.  
No other post-tensioning anchorage or post-tensioned 
suspended slab damage failure was reported or known to the 
authors.  
Punching shear failure of reinforced concrete flat-slab system 
was observed in one 10-storeys building designed and 
constructed in the 1970s.  
 
Figure 38: Punching shear failure of a 5-storey post-
tensioned flat-slab and columns building. 
(Photograph (c) is courtesy of David Swanson). 
Lack of displacement-allowance for simply-supported 
elements: One consistent observation in the 22 February 2011 
earthquake is the high displacement demands on structural 
elements. This applies also for “non-seismic – gravity-only 
elements such as simply-supported ramps, beams and 
staircases. Section 7 will expand further on the displacement 
incompatibility and demand on precast concrete staircases.  
Single-storey car park ramps are typically constructed with 
simply-supported flooring units (e.g. precast concrete 
prestressed hollow core units or Hi-Bond steel-concrete 
composite deck). However, it was observed that often the 
seating and gap provided for the simply-supported ramp unit 
was insufficient to prevent unseating and/or pounding onto 
each other or into the abutments.  
Figure 39 shows a column shear failure, possibly induced by 
the movement of the simply-supported ramp and trimmer 
beams. As the three parts (labelled A, B and C in Figure 39) 
all have different displacement responses (rigid to flexible in 
the order A to C), it is not surprising to see the damage in 
Figure 39.  
(c) 
(b) 
(a) 
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Figure 39:  Lack of displacement allowance for „simply-
supported‟ elements such as car park ramp 
leading to a column shear failure. 
Figure 40 illustrates the two observed failure modes (within 
the same car park complex as with Figure 39) of such simply-
supported elements due to the lack of displacement allowance. 
Figure 40a shows an unseating of a long-span prestressed 
hollow core ramp/deck unit. This is possibly due to the failure 
of the supporting wall and the insufficient seating provided.  
 
Figure 40: Lack of displacement allowance for „simply-
supported‟ elements leading to failure and collapse of car-
park ramp: a) Unseating of hollow core unit at one-simply 
supported end; b) Collapse of one bay of ramp, possibly due 
to compressive buckling and pounding with the abutment. 
Photographs are courtesy of John Marshall [38]. 
Figure 40b shows the collapse of one-bay of a ramp, possibly 
due to the compressive-buckling induced failure of the hollow 
core units as the deck/ramp pounded against the abutment. 
The seismic gap and sliding joint in between the ramp units, 
and at the sliding support at the abutment should be increased 
as per the recommendation for simply-supported precast 
concrete staircases [11]. Furthermore, continuity 
reinforcement should be provided between the topping 
concrete and the prestressed hollow core ramp in order to limit 
delamination of the topping concrete [38]. 
5.4 Precast panels connection/anchorage failure 
Failure and collapse of heavy precast concrete façade panels 
can be very hazardous to life-safety of the passer-byes. Further 
description of the performance of precast concrete façades can 
be found in a companion paper [4] in this special issue. 
Figure 41 shows an example of a collapsed precast concrete 
panel due to the failure of the rigid connections at the two 
ends. One of the two collapsed panels (Panel B as indicated in 
Figure 41a-b), was rigidly connected to two separate buildings 
(which naturally have different displacement response). It is 
likely that Panel B was displaced due to the relative 
displacement of the two buildings, and hit the end of Panel A. 
It may explain why Panel A dropped one to two metres away. 
Figure 41c and d show the different „rigid‟ anchorage 
connections used on the panels.  
  
Figure 41: Failure of heavy precast concrete panel 
connections: a) Panels prior to the earthquake; 
b) collapse of the panel at the entrance; c) 
Close-up view of the two anchorage types; d) 
Pull-out concrete cone on the panel.  
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Some precast concrete façade panel connection failures, as 
shown in Figure 42, occurred due to construction error. A 
close-up inspection (Figure 42b) of the connection angles 
attaching the concrete panels to the RC frame superstructure 
showed that the welding of the slotted bolt connection was 
welded to the washer plate.  
This construction error would thus have restricted in-plane 
deformation of the concrete panels relative to the RC frame 
inter-storey drift. Consequently, the rigid “welded-slotted 
bolt” connection failed and the panels collapsed out-of-plane. 
 
 
Figure 42: Failed precast concrete façade panels “welded 
and slotted-bolt” connection (construction error). 
5.5 RC Tilt-up industrial/commercial buildings 
Tilt-up precast concrete panels are a popular construction form 
for low-rise industrial/commercial buildings. The precast 
concrete panels are generally cantilevered at the base and 
joined together by steelwork or a concrete floor (for multi-
floors) at the top. Shear connection between the panels is also 
typically provided.  
Typical damage included fracture/failure of steel connectors 
and diagonal bracing, cracking of inter-panel connections and 
several complete collapses of the wall panels. Figure 43 shows 
a couple of examples of collapse/failure of precast concrete 
tilt-up structural walls.  
Figure 43a shows tilt-up walls as a part of the lateral-load 
resisting system of a two-storey car park building in a suburb 
of Christchurch. The wall failed in-plane along the base, 
followed by a loss of anchorage to the 1st floor diaphragm, 
resulting in out-of-plane collapse.  
Figure 43b shows an example of destabilisation and collapse 
of precast concrete tilt-up walls which were under 
construction at the time of the earthquake. It appears the 
connections between the orthogonal panels had failed, leading 
to the out-of-plane collapse of one panel and destabilisation of 
the other. 
A more detailed report on the seismic performance of low-rise 
precast-concrete tilt-up structures is given in reference [32]. 
 
Figure 43: Collapse of precast concrete tilt-up structural 
walls: a) Localised flexural failure along the base 
of the wall panel; b) Destabilisation of tilt-up 
concrete wall under construction.  
5.6 Advanced seismic resisting RC systems (post-
tensioned PRESSS, supplementary damping and 
base-isolation)  
The 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake has also tested 
a few innovative advanced seismic resisting RC systems such 
as the base-isolated moment-frame Christchurch Women‟s 
Hospital and the post-tensioned jointed-ductile precast 
concrete (PRESSS-technology) Southern Cross Hospital‟s 
Endoscopy Consultant Building.  
The Christchurch‟s Women Hospital is an 8-storey RC frame 
and steel braced building, supported on 41 Lead-Rubber 
Bearing isolation devices (Figure 44a). The building came 
through all the Canterbury earthquakes without significant 
structural damage in spite of some clear evidence of lateral 
deformation demand at the base relative to the surrounding 
ground [24]. The observed deformation at the building 
boundary (e.g. Figure 44b) suggests the lateral deformation to 
be at least 100 mm in the 22 February event.  
While after the 4 September earthquake the isolators have a 
residual displacement of 25 mm, the isolators had, incidentally 
returned to its original position after the 22 February 
aftershock (note the near zero residual displacement shown in 
Figure 44a). 
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The current increased requirement for the design level of 
seismicity for Christchurch [16] (i.e. a Hazard Factor, Z of 0.3 
instead of 0.22) is only valid for building with fundamental 
period up to 1.5 s. For building period above 1.5 s, special 
study of the seismic demand is required. The limitation was in 
response to the high spectral acceleration amplification in the 
long period range (2.0 s to 3.0 s) as discussed in Section 2.1. 
Such long period amplification might result in large boundary 
displacement gap requirements and stronger isolated 
superstructure with less reduction in the superstructure design 
base-shear.  
 
Figure 44: a) A Lead-Rubber-Bearing isolation device with 
near zero residual deformation (compared to 
50mm after the 4 September earthquake); b) The 
seismic moat cover on the ground level indicates 
significant lateral movement during the 
earthquake. 
The four storeys Southern Cross Hospital‟s Endoscopy 
(SCHE) Building is the first South Island PRESSS-technology 
building with precast concrete un-bonded post-tensioned 
frames (North-South) and coupled-walls (East-West) [58].  
The beam-elongation effect on the floor diaphragm from the 
post-tensioned frames was mitigated by placing the precast 
floor units orthogonal to the rocking moment-resisting frames 
and by using cast-in-situ band beam-slab at the top-hinging-
only beam-to-column rocking interface (Figure 45c). This is 
achieved by having only beam top longitudinal reinforcement 
connected into the column, in addition to the post-tensioned 
tendons. 
No observable structural damage was detected in the building 
after the 4th Sept 2010 7.1 Mw Darfield earthquake. SCHE 
building was almost immediately re-occupiable (after a 
prompt structural assessment).  
In the 22nd Feb 2011 6.2 Mw Christchurch earthquake, the 
structure had signs of significant transient movements, 
especially in the East-West longitudinal direction (consistent 
with the polarity of the Feb earthquake). On the top of the 
south walls, very minor crushing of the cover concrete was 
observed at the interface between the coupled walls. Most of 
the U-shaped Flat Plates (UFPs) had Lüders yield lines (Figure 
45b), indicating the building‟s inter-storey drift exceeded 
0.5%-0.75% (corresponding to the yield drift of the UFPs).  
Preliminary non-linear time-history analyses of the Endoscopy 
Consultant Building seismic response under the 22 February 
earthquake [58] suggests the building has experienced at least 
2.5% inter-storey drift demand. Minor cracking of the internal 
Gib-lined partitions also indicates significant level of transient 
lateral deformations of the building. 
As a reaction to the costly repair and demolition of many 
conventional RC buildings, the concept of designing for 
damage-avoidance systems using seismic-isolation, 
supplementary damping, or the re-centering rocking PRESSS 
system is emerging [10, 69].  
Given the suddenly appreciated importance of damage-control 
design and also the cost-efficiency of such systems, the post-
earthquake reconstruction of Christchurch may see more 
implementation of such advanced seismic resisting systems. 
 
  
Figure 45: Self-centring precast concrete system 
implemented for a newly constructed private hospital 
facility: a) Coupled post-tensioned rocking walls; b) 
Yield lines observed in the U-shaped flexural plates 
coupling the post-tensioned rocking walls; c) No 
residual crack along the rocking interface at the beam-
column connection.  
6 CRITICALLY DAMAGED OR COLLAPSED RC 
BUILDINGS 
In response to the public concern about the damage to and 
collapse of major buildings resulting in significant fatalities, 
the New Zealand Government, through its Department of 
Building and Housing (DBH) initiated a technical 
investigation on the structural performance of the four large 
multi-storey buildings in the Christchurch CBD which failed 
during the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 earthquake. The 
buildings included in the investigation are the Canterbury 
Television Building (CTV), Pyne Gould Corporation Building 
(PGC), Hotel Grand Chancellor (HGC) and Forsyth Barr 
Building.  
The Part 1 Expert Panel Report [18] along with technical 
investigation reports on three of the buildings (PGC, HGC and 
Forsyth Barr Building) have been submitted to the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into Building Failure caused by 
Canterbury Earthquakes [70]. The following sub-sections 
describe some of the structural characteristics and the 
observed damage/response of these buildings. Interested 
readers should refer to the Royal Commission of Inquiry 
website [70] for the more definitive and extensive reports on 
these buildings.  
6.1 Pyne Gould Corp (PGC) Building  
A summary of the building structural characteristics and 
observed damaged is discussed below; the technical 
(c) (b) 
(a) 
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investigation report conducted for the DBH should be 
consulted for further details [5].  
The Pyne Gould Corp (PGC) building was designed and built 
in 1963-64, near the time of seismic code revision in 1964-65 
(NZS1900:1965 [44]). It is a six-storeys five-by-five bays RC 
frames building (Figure 46) with an internal core wall. Figure 
47 shows the typical upper floor‟s structural plan view. 
 
Figure 46:  Pyne Gould Corp (PGC) Building photographed 
from the South-East elevation after the 4 
September 2011 earthquake.  
 
 
 
Figure 47:  Plan view of the typical upper floors (2nd to 
4th Floors). 
Structural systems: The lateral load resisting system consists 
of 8” (200 mm) thick RC core walls with two 15 m long RC 
walls along Grid Line D and E (acting in the North-South 
direction), and three shorter (two 5 m and one 2.6 m long) RC 
walls along Grid b and e (acting in the East-West direction). 
Figure 48 shows the East-West cross elevation view, which 
indicates some of the openings in the North-South 15 m long 
walls. The shorter RC walls have significant openings (two 
door openings of approximately 850 mm x 2,200 mm 
dimensions).  
In general, the 200 mm thick RC walls are very lightly 
reinforced with a single layer of 5/8” (16 mm) diameter 
deformed reinforcement spaced vertically and horizontally at 
15” (380 mm) centres. Longitudinal bars are lapped at above 
the floor level, with a lap length of 20” (508 mm). No wall 
cross-ties or boundary confinement ties are observed on the 
drawings, which was typical for RC walls of this vintage. 
In the East-West direction, six RC three-bays (10m-5m-10m) 
frames (most likely designed for gravity-load only) would 
contribute a minor level of lateral strength and stiffness. The 
E-W direction main beams are 33”x24” (840x 610 mm) at the 
1st floor and 27”x20” (685 x 510 mm) at 2nd floor to roof. At 
the Northern side of the building, four of the RC frames are 
framing into the core walls. In the second Southern frame line, 
there are two interior columns, measuring 16”x16” at the 
ground floor, and 12”x12” at the upper levels (see Figure 47).  
In the transverse North-South direction, there are two 
perimeter RC five-bay (5 m bay length) frames with no 
interior columns/framing. The transverse girder beams are 
33”x24” (840 mm x 610 mm) at the 1st floor and 22”x12” 
(560 mm x 305 mm) at the upper levels. The transverse beams 
span a regular length of 5.08 m. At the perimeter of the 
building, there are 38”x6” (965 mm x 150 mm) edge beams. 
 
Figure 48:  North-South elevation on Grid Line D. 
The ground floor perimeter columns are 16” (400 mm) 
diameter circular with 1/8” (3.2 mm) thick steel encasing 
while at upper levels, the perimeter columns are 10”x10” (254 
mm x 254 mm). The perimeter columns have a distinct 
discontinuity at the 1st floor (between Level 1 and Level 2 
columns). The upper level perimeter columns are offset 52” 
(1.321 m) from the Level 1 (Ground floor) columns. Steel 
beams were used at the connections between the upper floor 
perimeter columns to the ground floor columns.  
The columns are generally lightly confined and poorly detailed 
for deformation, when compared with what the current code 
[48] would require. Above the ground floor columns, ¼” (6.5 
mm) diameter stirrups at 9” (230 mm) centres are typically 
provided uniformly along the whole column height. ¼” (6.5 
mm) diameter spiral ties at 9” (230 mm) pitch are used for the 
ground floor columns. No joint transverse reinforcement was 
provided. 
After a seismic structural review in 1997, 18 200x100RHS 
steel props were installed behind each perimeter column (see 
Figure 48). Several precast concrete roof canopies were 
removed to reduce the falling hazard.  
As this is a building built prior to the introduction of modern 
seismic codes in the mid-1970s, the building had several 
critical detailing and reinforcing deficiencies typical of that 
vintage (lightly reinforced walls, no boundary or confinement 
reinforcing for walls, lack of beam-column joint 
reinforcement, limited number of walls, inadequate column‟s 
and beam‟s lap-splice length and inadequate floor/beam to 
column/wall anchorage) that could contribute to the collapse. 
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There is also a vertical stiffness and strength irregularity in 
between the Ground Floor and the upper floors, as there are 
several ground floor RC walls that discontinued at upper 
levels.  
According to the DBH report on PGC [5], the building had  
suffered minor damage after the 4 September 2010 and 26 
December 2010 earthquakes. Minor diagonal cracking of the 
RC core walls was observed and the occupants noted “the 
building became more responsive” in the subsequent 
aftershocks prior to the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
Damage observed in the 22 February 2011 earthquake: The 
upper five storeys suffered a soft-storey pancake collapse, 
with collapsed floors slanting towards to the East side, 
indicating of soft-storey failure along the East-West direction 
(Figure 49). No evidence of torsional twist was observed from 
the collapsed building. The ground floor structure appears 
mostly intact. 
 
Figure 49:  a) Southern elevation of the collapsed PGC 
building; b) South-Eastern elevation of the 
collapsed PGC building.  
According to the DBH report [5] and observed damage, the 
collapse appears to have been initiated at the 1st and 2nd Floors 
as shown in Figure 49 and Figure 50. The RC core walls in 
between the 1st and 2nd Floors had collapsed (Figure 50-Zoom 
A). The core walls at the upper floors were generally intact. 
Some diagonal cracks can be observed at the 2nd floor section 
of the RC walls.  
Considering the limited shear capacity of the 200 mm thick 
short walls in the East-West direction, the long RC walls are 
relied upon to provide the majority of the overturning 
moment. The 200 mm wall with single layer of vertical 
reinforcement has only limited ductility capacity and likely 
failed in flexural compressive buckling. The wall section is 
not confined for significant ductility demand.  
The RC frames were generally unable to develop ductile 
beam-hinging due to the evident lack of capacity design 
principles and poor connection detailing. The beam-column 
joints and columns failed prematurely (Figure 50-Zoom B and 
C). The frames were unable to sustain the significant 
displacement demand (after the failure of the RC core walls).  
  
    
Figure 50:  Various failure mechanisms observed on 
the Northern elevation of the collapsed PGC building.   
The beam-column joints were not reinforced with transverse 
ties and appeared to fail in shear. Column longitudinal bars 
were buckled at the damaged beam-column joints, losing 
theirs gravity-load carrying capacity. As shown in Figure 50-
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Zoom A, 1st and 2nd Floor RC columns were detached from 
the beam-column joints and lost theirs vertical-load capacity. 
Pull-out and anchorage failures of beams were also observed 
(Figure 50-Zoom A and B). 
The pull-out anchorage failure of the connection between the 
core walls and the framing beams and slabs is observed at 
least in the upper 2-storeys (Figure 49b and Figure 50-Zoom 
B). This is likely to occur with significant rotational demand at 
these connections due to the failure of the frames and walls.  
6.2 Canterbury Television (CTV) Building 
The actual cause of failure that led to the brittle and 
catastrophic collapse of the CTV building is currently under 
investigation by the DBH-commissioned technical study and 
the Royal Commission of Inquiry [70]. The following 
paragraphs are our general observation based on the available 
information and forensic inspection. Interested readers should 
follow the outcomes of the DBH and Royal Commission 
inquiries [70] to gain further understanding of the critical 
structural weaknesses that lead to the unexpected collapse of 
this mid-1980s-designed building.  
Figure 51 shows the CTV building from the south-east 
elevations. The typical floor plan of the CTV building is 
presented in Figure 52.  
 
Figure 51:  The CTV Building from the South-East 
corner. Photograph is courtesy of Dr Yuji Ishikawa. 
 
Figure 52:  Typical floor plan of the CTV building.  
The 6-storey RC building comprises a coupled-shear wall on 
the Southern side and a core RC wall on the Northern side of 
the building. Four RC frame lines provided some lateral 
resistance in the East-West direction. The entire building, with 
the exception of the core wall collapsed during the 22 
February 2011 aftershock. A major fire broke out almost 
immediately after the collapse of the building.  
The 300mm thick RC core walls on the Northern side of the 
building, measuring 4.8 m x 11.5 m long, were generally well-
reinforced with ductile detailing typical of 1980s construction. 
However, the RC core walls had limited connections to the 
floor diaphragm of the building, with approximately 11.5 m 
length of floor-slab (minus some void area due to lift 
penetration).  
Figure 53 illustrates the typical slab-to-core walls (slab and 
wall) connection detail. A Hi-Bond steel deck with 200 mm 
thick concrete reinforced with one-layer of cold-drawn wire 
mesh and one layer of H12 bars at 200 mm centres was relied 
upon for transferring the seismic inertial load from the main 
structure to the RC core walls.  
 
Figure 53:  Structural detail of the diaphragm 
connection to the RC core walls (refer to Figure 52): a) Slab 
– core wall connection A; b) Slab walls connection B. 
  
 
Figure 54:  Northern RC core walls of the CTV 
Building. Photograph (a) is taken on the 23rd February 
2011 by Mark Mitchell published in New Zealand 
Herald. Photograph (c) illustrates the remains of the Hi-
Bond floor slab deck at 3rd and 4th Floors.  
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Figure 54a shows the collapsed CTV building with the 
Northern RC core walls predominantly intact. The RC walls 
did not exhibit any significant residual distress or cracking, as 
observed in the post-earthquake inspection. It appears the 
main framed-superstructure detached from the RC core walls 
under the severe earthquake shaking.  
On the Southern elevation, there was a pair of 2.05 m long 
300mm thick RC walls coupled with a 900mm long coupling 
beam that would provide significant lateral load resistance. 
These coupled-walls remained largely intact after the building 
collapse (see Figure 55), with only limited cracking observed 
in the ground floor coupled-wall. The 1st Floor walls was 
observed to sustain significant out-of-plane deformation 
demand, possibly arising from the collapse.  
It appears only limited reinforcing was provided between the 
slab-to-coupled-wall connection (Figure 55c). Furthermore, 
the drawings indicate the H12 bars at 600 mm centres and the 
floor wire-mesh were not anchored using 90-degree bent 
hooks, typical of such connections (in modern RC design).  
 
Figure 55: Coupled walls on the Southern side: a) the 
coupled walls remains intact on the Ground Floor with 
limited flexural or shear cracking; b) All six pairs of 
the coupled-walls were accounted for during a post-
demolition inspection – limited damage were observed 
on these walls; c) the connection detail of slab-to-
coupled walls.  
The building comprises four RC frames in the East-West 
direction and two frames in the North-South direction. It 
appears these frames are predominantly gravity-load carrying 
frames.  
The typical columns are 400 mm diameter RC columns with 
six distributed HD20 (20 mm diameter) longitudinal 
reinforcement. The columns had 6mm spiral reinforcing at 
250mm pitch. The typical beams are 400x550 mm deep 
precast concrete beams with closer stirrup spacing near the 
supports than provided for the interior beams. 
All of the RC frames collapsed during the 22 February 2011 
6.2 Mw main shock. Many of the beam and column elements 
were found „intact‟ in the preliminary post-demolition forensic 
inspection of the building site (Figure 56).  
 
Figure 56: Post-demolition inspection of the RC frame 
elements: a) RC column with R6 spiral ties at 250 mm 
centre and six-HD20 longitudinal reinforcement.  
6.3 Grand Chancellor Hotel (GCH) 
The 22-storey Grand Chancellor Hotel (GCH) (1970s parking 
structure + 1986-1988 hotel tower construction) was severely 
damaged during the 22 February 2011 earthquake, leading to 
an approximately 1,300 mm horizontal lean of the top of the 
tower and restricted access to the potential fall zone around the 
building (Figure 57). 
A summary of the building characteristics and response during 
the earthquake is provided below; an extensive study 
conducted for the DBH [19] and the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry [70] should be consulted for further details. 
Significant structural irregularities influenced the behaviour of 
the GCH building in the 22 February earthquake. Most notably 
the east side of the building (bay D-E) was cantilevered over 
Tattersalls Lane (Figure 58), which was a subsequent redesign 
due to unexpected legal issues. 
The building was constructed in two phases. The lower 7 (or 
14 half-height car park) storey structure, which comprises RC 
shear walls and cast-in-place flat slabs and columns, was 
constructed first. The upper 15 full-height storey structure, 
(a) 
(b) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
265 
which comprises of perimeter moment frames with a precast 
floor system, was added subsequently.  
As indicated in Figure 58, the Eastern bay of the lower 14 
half-height floors was cantilevered using several very deep 
transfer girders between levels 12 and 14. The southernmost 
transfer girders were supported on a critical shear wall denoted 
as D5-6 in Figure 59. Above the 14th floor, bay D-E is 
cantilevered by beams at each level and grid line.  
 
Figure 57: The Southern elevation of the Grand Chancellor 
Hotel, with a distinct 200 to 400mm lean towards the 
East (right) side immediately after the 22 February 
2011 earthquake.  
 
 
 
Figure 58:  Schematic plan and elevation of the 
Grand Chancellor Hotel. The floor numbering is based on 
the original construction drawings – the lower 14 floors are 
half-height car park floors. The building comprises 22 
suspended storeys which includes a plant room level. 
The 5 m long 400 mm thick RC wall D5-6 on the Southern 
side, supports a disproportionately large tributary gravity load 
from all floors as a result of the cantilever system. Wall D5-6 
was reinforced with two layers of 20 mm diameter vertical 
bars at 300 mm centres and two layers of 16 mm diameter 
horizontal bars at 200 mm centres. The wall boundary 
reinforcement consisted of 4-D24 supported by a single plain 
round 10 mm diameter hoop at 150 mm centres. The 
symmetrical wall on the Northern side was more heavily 
reinforced (one bar size up and more boundary reinforcing) as 
it has a lower “design” axial force level compared to wall D5-
6.  
As shown in Figure 59-left, during the 22 February earthquake 
wall D5-6 experienced a brittle shear-axial failure at its base 
and displaced downward approximately 800 mm along a 
diagonal failure plane through the thickness of the wall. The 
failure plane, extending the full length of the wall, appeared to 
initiate at the top of the lap splice in the web vertical 
reinforcement. The limited hoops in the boundary appeared to 
have opened allowing the boundary longitudinal bars to 
deform with the shortening of the wall. Crushing of concrete 
was also noted at the top of the lobby wall, likely to 
accommodate the out-of-plane movement of the wall as it slid 
down the diagonal failure plane.  
Wall D5-6 was likely supporting very high axial loads from 
several sources. First, as noted previously the wall supported a 
disproportionately high tributary area due to the cantilever 
structure. Secondly, the corner column of the upper tower 
perimeter moment frame would have imparted high axial loads 
due to overturning moments, particularly with any bi-
directional movement to the south-east. Thirdly, vertical 
excitation of the cantilever structures, both above and below 
level 14, could have exacerbated the axial load on wall D5-6.  
Finally, wall D5-6 would have also attracted in-plane loads 
due to N-S earthquake excitation, leading to flexural 
compression stresses on one end of the wall.  
Considering the potential for simultaneous compression from 
all sources of axial loads described above, it is expected that 
the combined axial load and bending in the wall likely 
exceeded the concrete compression strain capacity given the 
limited tie reinforcement provided at the base of the wall. It is 
noted that wall D5-6 was relatively more slender for its 
double-height at Ground Floor. The double-height atrium may 
result in wall aspect ratio (height-to-thickness) that was not 
code-compliance [19]. 
Some out-of-plane drift of the wall during the earthquake 
excitation and the plane of weakness created at the end of the 
splice of the web vertical reinforcement, further contributed to 
the location of failure at the base of wall D5-6. It is likely that 
failure of wall D5-6 precipitated other significant damage 
observed in the building, including shear and axial failure of 
level 10 columns supporting the southern transfer girders (see 
Figure 58 and Figure 60), lap splice damage where the tension 
column connected to the transfer beam on grid line 8, and 
hinging of beams on east face of the building (Figure 59-
centre).  
With the failure of wall D5-6, the two columns at level 10 
immediate below the Southern-end transfer girders (see Figure 
58) are likely to have experienced significant and a sudden 
increase in force and deformation demands. Axial loads would 
have increased as gravity loads redistributed with the axial 
failure of wall D5-6. Shear demands would have increased as 
the columns provided a partial moment restraint for the 
transfer girders. Finally, progressive (albeit instantaneous) 
failure of the wall D5-6 and the columns under the transfer 
girds also resulted in shear-failure of the next line of columns 
on Grid B. 
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Similar to many buildings in Christchurch, the GCH building 
had two sets of precast staircases, back-to-back in scissor 
alignment, located at the centre of the building adjacent to the 
primary E-W shear wall. 
The precast concrete scissor staircases were supported by cast-
in-situ transverse RC beams, spanning in between two interior 
RC frames. The shear and bearing transfers were achieved by 
two 120-140 mm long protruded 76x76x6.3mm RHS. The 
available seating was approximately 70mm, considering 
construction tolerance and the available 30mm gap. 
The significant lateral deformation of the building and the 
localised vertical collapse at the South-East corner of the 
building would have imposed substantial differential 
displacement between the supporting beams of the staircase. 
The excessive differential lateral deformation resulted in the 
pull-out failure of the RHS stubs and resulted in progressive 
collapse of the precast staircases. Whether this detailing is the 
critical weakness of the collapse of one of the two internal 
staircases in GCH (see Figure 65), whose lateral displacement 
demand were exacerbated by the failure and tilting of the base 
wall, will need to be further investigated. 
7 STAIRCASES IN MULTI-STOREY BUILDING 
Collapse and severe damage of staircases in multi-storey 
buildings have been observed in many instances in the 22 
February 2011 earthquake. 
The concern of the seismic performance of modern high-rise 
RC buildings relates to the non-structural damage in 
emergency stairways, and the resulting loss of emergency 
egress was also noted and reported after the 4 September 
earthquake [35]. 
In a number of medium to high-rise buildings, staircases 
exhibited significant damage in buildings where the inter-
storey movements of the staircases have been restrained. 
Complete or partial collapses of internal precast concrete 
staircases have been reported for at least four multi-storey 
high-rise buildings (e.g. Figure 61 to Figure 65).  
Minor to moderate levels of movement/damages of the 
staircases were observed in many other mid- to high-rise 
buildings (Figure 62).  
A
W-E Frame
 
Figure 59:  Grand Chancellor Hotel: The shear-axial failure of the RC wall D5-6 and the resulting damage pattern.  
   
Figure 60:  Grand Chancellor Hotel: The shear-axial failure of the RC columns below the transfer girders at Level 10 and 11.  
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Figure 61:  Collapse of precast concrete staircase in multi-
storey buildings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As discussed in Section 2.2 and elsewhere in this report, one 
consistent observation in the 22 February 2011 earthquake is 
the very high displacement demands on structural and non-
structural elements. The observed staircase damage in the 
multi-storey buildings indicated that the deformation 
allowance they had been designed for (even when compatible 
with the code-requirements at that time) was typically 
inadequate to sustain the very high seismic demand. 
Considering that staircases are a critical safety egress in 
buildings, it is clear that a major re-consideration of the design 
philosophy of staircases in multi-storey buildings (RC or 
otherwise) will be needed. An interim approach to assess and 
retrofit existing stairs has been developed and issued as 
Practice Advisory by the Department of Building and Housing 
[11, 17]. Further description of New Zealand practice for 
staircase design is given in [11, 34]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 62:  Typical „severe‟ top and bottom landing damage of precast concrete staircase in 
multi-storey buildings. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) (d) 
(e) 
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Figure 63: Typical detailing and damage of staircase with partially pinned-slide bottom connection; cast-in-situ connection at 
top with longitudinal starter bars lapped at landing. Image (left) is courtesy of Umut Akguzel and photographs 
(right) are from USAR engineers. 
  
Figure 64: Collapse of one out of two internal scissor staircases in a multi-storey RC frame building. The staircase was under 
repair work for the damage sustained in the 4 September 2010 earthquake.  
                                         
               
 
 
Figure 65: Alternative typical detailing of staircase- Type A - Pinned-slide connections with RHS shear keys on both ends and 
observed failures. (Damage photographs are courtesy of USAR engineers). 
Sliding end slipped about 50mm. 
Fractured starter bars 
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8 EMERGENCY AND POST-EARTHQUAKE 
REPAIR 
Immediately after the 22 February earthquake it was 
recognized that several RC buildings had suffered critical 
damage, bringing into question the stability of the buildings 
during on-going aftershocks. Rapid stabilization techniques 
were needed to ensure public safety and facilitate response and 
recovery efforts in the immediate vicinity of the buildings.  
Before stabilization methods could be selected and designed, it 
was essential to determine the extent of damage to the 
structures and the probable cause. Critical to this process was 
the availability of structural drawings for the damaged 
buildings; facilitating rapid evaluation of the probable extent 
of damage prior to detailed inspection of the damaged 
buildings. Critically-damaged buildings were also monitored 
by surveyors to determine post-earthquake residual 
deformations and any further deformation with subsequent 
aftershocks.  
The first priority of the emergency repair was to achieve 
sufficient stability such that emergency workers‟ access to 
surrounding streets and buildings was considered safe. 
Sufficient stabilization to enable escorted access to the interior 
of the damaged building for the recovery of important contents 
was a secondary objective. It was generally not anticipated 
that the emergency stabilization would lead to a condition 
where the building could be re-occupied. Many of the 
buildings which received emergency repairs are expected to be 
demolished in the coming months. 
Figure 66 through to Figure 69 provide examples of 
emergency stabilization techniques used within the first weeks 
of the 22 February earthquake.  
Figure 66 shows the stabilization of shear wall D5-6 from the 
Grand Chancellor Hotel discussed in Section 6.3 (see Figure 
59-left for condition of wall prior to stabilization). A primary 
design consideration in selecting this stabilization technique 
was to limit the time the contractor would be in the building 
prior to completing the concrete pedestal in the first stage of 
construction.  
 
Figure 66:  Concrete encasement for temporary stabilisation 
of an axial-shear-damaged RC wall. 
The concrete pedestal was mass concrete with minimum 
reinforcement cast around the severely damaged wall base to 
ensure further crushing or movement of the wall could not 
occur. After the pedestal was completed, the stability of the 
building was considered to be dramatically improved and the 
contractor was allowed extended access to the building.  
Reinforcement was placed along the wall height and under the 
damaged slab prior to completing the stabilization by 
shotcreting both sides of the wall, with sufficient anchorage to 
the 1st floor slab soffit.  
Figure 67 shows a typical stabilization technique used to 
restore the axial and shear integrity of several heavily 
damaged columns (see Figure 60 for condition of columns 
prior to stabilization). The steel encased reinforced concrete 
improves confinement and shear capacities of the damaged RC 
columns. The steel jacket was fabricated in several sections so 
it could be easily moved into the building, connected together 
around the columns, sealed at the joints between sections, and 
finally filled with concrete.  
 
Figure 67:  Emergency stabilisation repair of the columns 
with axial-shear failure. See Figure 60 for the 
pre-repair condition of the columns. 
Figure 68 shows an example where the steel-encasing 
reinforced concrete jacketing was used in conjunction with a 
concrete pedestal. The emergency stabilisation shown in 
Figure 68 corresponds to the building damage discussed in 
Figure 31 and Figure 32. 
  
Figure 68:  Emergency stabilisation repair of the basement 
columns with axial-shear failure. 
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The steel encased RC jacketing provides improved 
confinement and shear capacities to the damaged columns. 
The concrete pedestal was expected to provide additional 
base-shear capacity (considering the ground floor diaphragm 
was no longer effective in transferring shear forces to the 
basement perimeter walls).  
For cases where damage had not significantly impacted the 
stability of the building, but where extensive concrete crushing 
and/or bar fracture made standard repair techniques (e.g. 
epoxy injection) insufficient, encasement of the damaged 
region in reinforced concrete was typically adopted.  
Figure 69 shows the repair to the damaged RC walls from 
Figure 34. In Figure 69a, bolted steel straps and a U-shaped 
confinement plate were provided in order to restore the 
confinement capacity of the wall with buckled longitudinal 
bars (and inadequate confinement ties).  
  
Figure 69:  Emergency stabilisation repair of RC walls with 
a) buckled boundary longitudinal bars with 
inadequate confinement ties; b) fracture 
boundary longitudinal bars across a single 
cracking line.  
In Figure 69b, steel plates were added to the wall with 
fractured boundary bars in order to re-establish the flexural 
capacity of the wall. As there was inadequate time to assess 
the extent of the damage properly, the design of the repair 
work has made certain assumptions that many of the 
longitudinal bars may have fractured or yielded significantly. 
 
Figure 70:  Crack epoxy grout injection repair for RC wall.  
Figure 70 above and Figure 29b illustrate the use of epoxy 
grout injection as a repair method for RC frame and wall 
elements with a ductile damage mechanism. While an epoxy 
grout may work to reinstate the concrete compression 
capacity, reseal the cracks for durability and may improve the 
serviceability stiffness, it is arguably less ineffective in 
restoring any concrete-to-reinforcement bond or enhancing 
flexural and in particular shear capacity under a similar 
earthquake event. 
More experimental work is required to confirm the reliability 
of standard repairing techniques for different failure 
mechanisms. 
9 PRELIMINARY LESSONS 
The 22 February (Lyttleton) earthquake event has, in its 
complexity, emphasised to the extreme a combination of “old” 
(either well known or expected to be known) and “new” (not-
really expected) lessons possibly in the whole area of 
earthquake engineering.  
It is of interest to note that the SESOC preliminary report on 
the observations from the Christchurch Earthquakes [72] has 
made some interim recommendations based on the lessons 
learnt, some of which are consistent herein. 
9.1 Aftershocks effects and design level earthquake 
One of the most important lessons is the confirmation of 
severe misunderstanding between public and scientists, on one 
hand, as well as potential miscommunication between 
seismologists and engineers, on the other, on the definition 
and thus likely impacts of “aftershock” and “design level 
earthquake”.  
To a certain extent this is often associated with the use in 
communication of earthquake magnitude (related to the energy 
released) instead of shaking intensity (e.g. Modified Mercalli 
Intensity or ground acceleration)to express the severity of the 
earthquake. 
As shown by the Canterbury sequence, the “aftershock” event 
on 22 Feb 2011 caused a much more significant “shaking 
intensity” in the CBD, expressed by the combination of peak 
ground accelerations, displacement, velocity, duration and 
energy content visible through response spectra, than the main 
shock in 4 September 2011.   
The general perceptions supported by lack of clear internal or 
external communication on the matter around the world has 
typically and, in the wake of Christchurch earthquake, 
inappropriately suggested that aftershocks following the main 
event would be “less strong” and thus “less damaging”. 
The consequence of what could appear to be a simple 
discussion on semantic and definitions has in fact an 
extremely important impact on decision making processes 
particularly when dealing with insurance companies, re-
occupation of lightly damaged buildings, and also with 
repairing/retrofitting and reconstruction considerations.  
The complex question to answer is: should current 
international procedure for building inspection and, to a more 
detailed and robust degree, detailed seismic assessment of the 
vulnerability of a building account for the possibility of 
aftershocks being more damaging than main shock? Also how 
long such a window of potentially higher aftershocks be kept 
open (months, years)?  
Clearly this would depend on the peculiar characteristics of 
the local seismicity, but once again, information and better 
understanding of that can often and apparently be gained with 
confidence only after the occurrence of a substantial sequence 
of earthquakes.  
More importantly, a clear communication between 
seismologists and engineers (both structural and geotechnical) 
and the general public of the technical definitions of the 
“design level earthquake” and “aftershock” are made.  
(a) (b) 
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9.2 Earthquake codes and seismic design – ductile 
design, MCE, and displacement-based design? 
“Earthquakes do not read the code” would be one of the most 
famous quotes of late Prof. Tom Paulay. However obvious this 
statement may appear, the actual impacts on the daily practice 
tend to be forgotten or over-looked.  
As a corollary of such a statement, there is nothing such as a 
spectrum-compatible earthquake event. Design spectrum used 
in code as well as, in more general terms, all code-
requirements, should be used for what they are and meant to 
be: minimum standards by law, not a target, as it too often are 
treated. A proper design should thus account for and deal with 
such uncertainties in a practical and transparent manner. 
The capacity design philosophy and ductile detailing are 
meant to account for the unexpected and uncertainties within 
the seismic design load level. In some cases however, the use 
higher elastic strength for a „nominal ductile‟ loading within 
NZS1170:2004 (μ=1.25 and Sp factor=0.925) may give a false 
sense of robustness based on an elastic force-based design 
without a verification of the building collapse mechanism. 
SESOC interim report [72] has recommended the use of 
Maximum Considered Earthquake (MCE) as a design limit 
state in NZS1170:2004. However, if the uncertainty in relation 
to defining the „exact‟ earthquake hazard and loading is 
considered, perhaps the emphasis should be on a compulsory 
ductile mechanism design in all seismic loading scenarios for 
buildings with significant consequences of collapse. 
There is a need for a stronger emphasis on a ductile inelastic 
mechanism (irrespective of the loading), robust load path 
(with alternative redundant load paths) and good detailing to 
allow for redundant load-path or “safety-plan” mechanism to 
be activated should the intended lateral load resisting system 
not perform as intended.  
Furthermore, there is an opportunity and need to recalibrate 
the current force-based seismic design practice to a more 
rational and performance-based displacement-design approach 
(e.g. [65]). The Christchurch earthquake has again 
demonstrated the need for displacement capacity and 
compatibility for the entire structure. Within the displacement-
design framework [65], structural designers are “forced” into 
considering the ductile inelastic mechanism, available 
ductility/displacement capacity (not an arbitrary selected 
ductility), and the displacement response of the building 
(instead of displacement response computed by elastic models 
multiplied by the arbitrary ductile value).  
9.3 The impact of acceptable damage to modern 
buildings and the wider city impact 
In general, a large majority of the RC buildings, particularly 
the modern (post-1976) buildings with capacity-design 
consideration, performed as expected of them in a severe 
earthquake, with formation of plastic hinges in the beams, 
coupling beams and base of walls and columns (e.g. Figure 19 
and Figure 28).  
As discussed in the preceding Section, a cost-efficient reliable 
repairing (and strengthening) solution can be particularly 
complex and delicate design decision. Furthermore, there is a 
general lack of robust information on procedures and 
techniques to estimate with confidence the residual ductility 
capacity of such damaged plastic-hinges in the event of one or 
more severe aftershock.   
As a result of the actual damage and the perceivably excessive 
uncertainties on the expected performance of the structure in a 
likely-to-happen moderate-strong aftershock, many of these 
“modern” multi-storey buildings will be demolished. 
Notably, the latter “simple‟ operation of demolition itself can 
involve, when dealing with multi-storey buildings, quite an 
extensive time and not negligible costs.  
More importantly, all the above required operations, namely 
the emergency inspection of building (e.g. BSE Level 1 and 
Level 2) in the emergency-recovery situation, detailed 
assessment of the structural damage and expected 
performance,  the  design of a repair/strengthening or 
demolition plan, the council approval and actual 
implementation of these plans, are inevitably delaying 
significantly not only the “heavy” reconstruction process, but 
also, on a daily basis, the accessibility of the CBD area, thus 
affecting the business operation (downtime) of many close-by 
buildings  
Such considerations on the wider impact of the low 
performance of a single building to the adjacent or close-by 
buildings is typically not accounted for when considering 
retrofit strategies, insurance premium, building consent, etc. A 
wider vision and plan, looking more at urban scale or at least 
at a sub-urban area scale, should be adopted in the near future. 
9.4 Revisiting Performance-based Design Criteria and 
Objectives: the need to raise the bar 
The excessive socio-economic impact of the 22 February 2011 
(Lyttelton) earthquake have confirmed the need to revisit the 
overall targets set in the current seismic design approach. 
Similarly, it has emphasised the crucial need for improved 
communication to the general public and building owners as to 
what would be the expected level of damage in a code-
compliant newly designed or recently strengthened building. 
The intention of modern seismic design, or the more recent 
performance-based seismic design (e.g. the SEAOC Vision 
2000 [71]) is generally to minimise life-safety risk on a 
specific „design-level‟ earthquake – typically a 500-year return 
period earthquake or 10% probability of occurrence in 50 
years building life for a normal-use structure. For a rare 
earthquake (typically a 2,500-year return period earthquake or 
2% probability of occurrence in 50 years building life, the 
collapse risk is minimised.  
Figure 71 illustrates these concepts in a performance design 
objective matrix, which simply indicates the higher the 
earthquake intensity, the higher the level of damage that 
should be expected and thus somehow “accepted” (if 
minimum standards have been adopted). 
IrreparableRepairable
 
Figure 71: Performance-Based design Objective matrix and 
modification (blue line) to increase the targeted 
performance toward a Damage-Control level. 
As discussed in other sections, in order to achieve the design 
objective, the current seismic design of ductile structural 
systems limits the structural damage to selected discrete 
“ductile” zone of the structure. However, it inherently implies 
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that damage, repair cost and building downtime are expected 
and accepted as unavoidable at the building „design level 
earthquake‟.  
In retrospective, considering the shaking intensity of the 22 
February earthquake, in which the seismic loading was at least 
twice the design level (for a normal-use building), the damage 
observed to the older and modern buildings was not at all 
unexpected (for structural engineers).  
However but not surprisingly, following the actual impact of a 
severe earthquake as in 22 February building owners, tenants, 
insurers, territorial authorities, and public opinion, have a 
remarkably different expectation of an “earthquake-resistant” 
building.  
As a further confirmation of this lack of understanding and 
proper communication between technical and non-technical 
parties involved, the level of damage referred to in the matrix 
above is mostly associated with the structural part, or the 
skeleton, with the declared expectations and acceptance that 
most of the non-structural elements such as  partitions, 
claddings, glazing can potentially be heavily damaged.  
Our experience in the September earthquake have shown that, 
even when the structural skeleton is relatively sound, the 
direct repairing costs of non-structural elements and the 
associated indirect costs due to the downtime and business 
interruption can represent a major component of the overall 
“losses”.  
In order to resolve this major perception gap and dangerous 
misunderstanding, a twofold approach is required [55]:  
1. On one hand, it is necessary to significantly improve the 
communication to the client, insurance, local authorities, 
and general public, of the seismic risk and expected 
building performance levels for a given code-compliant 
design. It must be clear that the targeted performance 
levels are considered “minimum standards”, with the 
possibility of achieving better performance if desired.  
2. On the other hand, it is also possible to “raise the bar” by 
modifying the New Zealand Building Code, to shift the 
targeted performance levels from the typically accepted 
collapse prevention objective under a severe earthquake, 
to a fully operational objective (with expected capital 
cost premium to the society). This is represented in 
Figure 71 by a tangible shift of the objective lines to the 
left. This will require a societal debate of the acceptable 
performance and regulatory move towards higher 
performance levels (or lower acceptable damage levels).  
In order to “raise the bar” two clear solutions are available: 
 Increase the level of seismic design loading (e.g., 
increase the seismic coefficient or Hazard Factor Z).  
 Move to higher-performance building technology. 
As an interim measure for the elevated seismic of the 
Canterbury region, the design seismic Hazard Factor Z has 
been raised from 0.22 to 0.3 [16]. Similarly, the requirement 
for serviceability limit state earthquake (via R factor) has been 
increased from 0.25 to 0.33. 
9.5 Inadequate displacement capacity of secondary or 
gravity-only elements  
The overall and complex implications of displacement 
incompatibility between the main lateral load resisting systems 
(or primary elements) and gravity-only or mainly bearing 
systems (or secondary elements) have been fully recognized in 
code-design provisions (since the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake) and yet much needs to be done even in the design 
of new structures to account for the actual 3D response of the 
building and required “compatible” movement of its parts. 
As already noted in the reconnaissance report from the 4 
September earthquake  [35], as well as demonstrated in 
laboratory tests [8], gravity-columns belonging to interior (or 
exterior) frames designed prior to the 1995 New Zealand 
Concrete Standards (NZS3101: 1995) may have inadequate 
displacement/ductility capacity (in terms of transverse 
reinforcement and confinement detailing). These columns, 
under moderate drift demand can undergo severe shear 
damage and thus lose their vertical load carrying capacity.  
„Gravity-only‟ or „secondary‟ elements have been observed to 
either participate as part of the lateral load structural system or 
displace along the main seismic system. In either scenario, 
damage, in particular gravity columns and gravity reinforced 
concrete block walls have been observed. Higher level of 
displacement demand imposed on these inadequately detailed 
“secondary” elements can result, as it was observed in few 
cases, resulting in severe if not catastrophic consequences. 
Considering that building displacement response is typically 
estimated by elastic analysis in the structural design, more 
emphasis should be placed on adequate detailing of these 
secondary predominantly-gravity load bearing elements to 
avoid collapse under a MCE displacement demand. 
Similarly, when designing new structures, higher level of 
redundancy, as discussed in previous paragraphs, should be 
built in, to allow for alternative load path as well as to avoid 
disproportionate collapse as a consequence of a higher-than-
expected event.  
9.6 Stairs 
As described in Section 7, the collapses and significant 
damage of stairs in a number of mid- to high-rise modern 
buildings have raised a serious concern at an international 
level. Flexible multi-storey buildings with scissor stair 
configuration with a limited sliding gap detail appear to be the 
most critical case. 
DBH Practice Advisory 13 [17] has outlined some interim 
measures for assessment and retrofit of stairs in multi-storey 
buildings in order to avoid the catastrophic collapses observed 
in the 22 February earthquake.  
From the structural perspective, the damage observed in stairs 
relates to the lack of displacement capacity of its supports and 
connections. However, considering the crucial role staircases 
have in terms of safety egress from buildings, re-consideration 
of the design of staircases is required.  
Current design approaches for the design of stairs for adequate 
displacement demand are available (e.g. [11]). However, 
considering the difficulty in estimating inter-storey drift using 
an elastic analysis, higher-than-expected displacement demand 
should be considered.  
Alternative design option such as sliding support on floor slab 
with conservative seating length (instead of gap-and-ledge 
arrangement), isolated self-contained stairwell tower (within 
isolated shear walls) or staircase with redundant catch restraint 
(e.g. hanger or tie-back detail) or partial-height catch 
frame/beam (to avoid progressive collapse due to one flight 
failure). 
9.7 Pre-1970s RC buildings vulnerability – time for an 
active retrofit programme? 
Whilst the excessive damage to modern (post-1976) buildings 
might have come as a partial surprise, partly justified by the 
high intensity of the shaking, the seismic vulnerability of pre-
1970s RC buildings has been internationally well recognized 
in the last two decades.  
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In addition to lessons from past overseas earthquakes, and 
recent research on the seismic vulnerability of RC buildings 
designed to NZ construction practice (e.g. [66] under FRST-
funded Retrofit Solution project), the observed damage of the 
pre-1970 RC buildings as discussed in Section 4, confirmed 
the widespread common problems of pre-modern seismic 
design.  
The common list of structural deficiencies of pre-1970s RC 
buildings in the literature was mostly observed in the 22 
February 2011 earthquake. The inherent brittle behaviour of 
these buildings can tend to a “switch on-off” mechanism, in 
which elastic response at low levels of shaking may give a 
false sense of confidence and a brittle collapse may occur in a 
higher level of seismic shaking.  
A paper by the first two authors [59] after the 7.1 Mw 4 
September earthquake has highlighted the possibility of severe 
damage/collapse of pre-1970s RC buildings in earthquake 
with different shaking characteristics (near-fault motion with 
directivity or long duration long-period Alpine-fault type 
motion).  
Solutions for strengthening and upgrading existing RC 
buildings have been developed worldwide and are available.  
However, similarly to all other countries, in spite of the high 
risk of collapse of such buildings under a moderate-severe 
earthquake, there is a lack of enforcement of 
strengthening/retrofit/seismic upgrading. This is mainly due to 
the perceived excessive cost to the community and the poor 
communication of the actual cost-benefit of safer buildings to 
the community. 
Territorial authorities in New Zealand generally have a 
seismic vulnerability assessment/screening and strengthening 
of earthquake-prone buildings policy as required by the 2004 
Building Act. However, most territorial authorities have a 
passive policy of which the earthquake-prone buildings policy 
will only be triggered by a change of use or significant 
alteration work.  
The aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes have witnessed 
a rise in public awareness and building owners actions of the 
seismic vulnerability of these older non-ductile buildings. 
Therefore, there is a window of opportunity for the seismic 
engineering industry and local territorial authorities to pursue 
a more aggressive approach to minimise the seismic 
vulnerability of these building stock in New Zealand.  
If the 1931 Hawkes Bay earthquake has effectively stopped 
the unreinforced masonry construction practice and raised the 
awareness of seismic strengthening, 2011 Christchurch 
earthquake should have the similar effect on removing 
earthquake prone buildings from New Zealand cities, in 
particular the pre-1931 unreinforced masonry buildings and 
pre-1970s RC buildings, either by seismic strengthening or 
complete demolition of such buildings. 
9.8 Irregularity effects (plan and vertical) – inelastic 
design verification? 
In general, buildings with significant plan and/or vertical 
irregularity were found to perform very poorly. The damage 
observations presented in previous Sections has highlighted 
irregularity as one of the main contributing factor in triggering 
unexpected structural response.  
For example, RC walls that discontinued above the basement 
level were observed to induce severe damage on the transfer 
slabs and on the basement columns and walls (e.g. Figure 32). 
Plan irregularity as a consequence of inelastic behaviour of 
perimeter lateral-resisting systems (walls or frames) leading to 
inelastic torsion amplification was another observed 
phenomena.  
The irregularity arising from a localised inelastic mechanism 
of a regular building (e.g. transverse frames yielding prior to 
the walls in the longitudinal directions etc.) is a complex 
design problem.  
The current seismic Loading Standards NZS1170.5:2004 [41] 
has a reasonably robust definition of irregularity which will 
trigger various analysis and design requirements. However, 
the current practice of reliance on a 3D elastic structural 
model to provide demand amplification for an expected 
inelastic torsional behaviour can be misleading and might not 
yield the desirable building performance.  
Arguably, a simple inelastic analysis such as that proposed by 
Prof Paulay [62] may yield a predictable performance level, 
rather than reliance on elastic 3D model. Alternatively, for 
complex and important structures (e.g. Importance Level 3/4) 
perhaps the use of non-linear 3D model for seismic design 
verification is warranted.  
9.9 Vertical acceleration, bi-directional loading and 
variation of axial loading 
The vertical acceleration observed in the 22 February 2011 
earthquake was very high but is comparable to other near-fault 
records observed. However, the impact of vertical 
accelerations on building performance is unclear.  
For example, the current design of columns and walls can rely 
significantly on the vertical axial-load component for their 
shear and flexural capacities. Whether the excessive vertical 
acceleration diminishes these vertical axial load is unclear.  
Similarly, the design of vertical load-bearing elements (e.g. 
columns, walls, joints, cantilevered beams and transfer beams) 
is based on some particular assumptions of the axial loading. 
The vertical acceleration on columns and walls can result in 
the variation of axial load and increases the compressive strain 
demand. In additional, bi-directional loading can also increase 
and decrease the axial load demand on the columns, walls and 
beam-column joints,  
Conventionally, the variation of axial load is only considered 
from the lateral actions of the building and not the reduction 
(or amplification) of the gravity-load components due to 
vertical acceleration. While it is argued that the vertical 
acceleration duration is very short and therefore unable to 
generate sufficient variation of axial load, the high number of 
compressive-failure of flexural-shear elements may suggest 
that the design analysis may need to include the variation of 
axial loads from all possible loading combinations.  
9.10 Shear wall detailing and design for confinement 
and compression 
Perhaps some of the most important lessons for modern 
construction relate to the performance of reinforced concrete 
wall buildings. While capacity design approaches protected 
shear walls against shear failures in modern wall buildings, 
unexpected flexural compression and tension failures in 
numerous shear walls in Christchurch indicate the need to 
modify shear wall design provisions to improve the flexural 
ductility of slender walls.  In particular, the following issues 
deserve further research and should be addressed in future 
building codes: 
 Shear walls designed for nominal ductility, without 
sufficient boundary zone confinement, can experience 
brittle concrete crushing in the compression zone.  The 
concrete strain capacity of thin walls without 
confinement may be less than typically assumed values. 
Similar observations were made in 2010 Chile 
earthquake. 
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 If crushing is avoided through the confinement of the 
compression zone, shear walls with thin webs 
unsupported by an enlarged boundary or flange may be 
vulnerable to buckling of the compression zone.  This 
may be a particular concern for T-, L-, or V-shaped walls 
where the web can be subjected to high tensile strains 
followed by high compression strains prior to yielding of 
the flange reinforcement. Buckling of a wall‟s web was 
observed in a well-confined compression zone with 
storey height to thickness ratio less than 10. 
 To avoid brittle compression failures and web buckling, 
codes may need to limit the depth of the compression 
stress block to ensure a tension-controlled failure mode 
can develop in a slender shear wall. 
 Fracture of small boundary zone bars in two modern 
buildings suggests that minimum reinforcement 
provisions for boundary zones of shear walls should be 
reviewed.  
 The effect of a „high‟ concrete tensile strength in 
inducing high strain demands on the wall reinforcing 
needs to be quantified via further research.  
 Wall design typically assumes a plastic hinge extending 
approximately half the wall length from the ground level.  
Damage from the Christchurch earthquake suggests that 
the hinge may occur above the ground level (potentially 
outside the confined zone) over a length that is 
considerably shorter than half the wall length. 
 The lack of confinement ties in the web and core of the 
walls in the plastic hinge region under significant gravity 
axial load is another area that requires further research.  
9.11 Near-fault pulse-like seismic loading 
A large number of seismic acceleration records of the 4 
September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes have 
shown the strong ground motions with forward directivity 
effects within 20km from the fault. Preliminary analysis of the 
strong ground motions has confirmed the high velocity pulse 
and forward directivity effects observed in the CBD records in 
the 22 February 2011 event [9].  
Since the 1971 San Francisco earthquake, the peculiar 
structural response to near-fault ground motions has been 
documented [7, 75]. The amplification of seismic wave in the 
direction of rupture due to forward directivity effect leads to a 
low-cycles motion with a coherent long period velocity pulse 
termed as “fling effect”. Near-fault motion has shown to cause 
significant strength, displacement and ductility demand in 
structures as well as variation in inter-storey shear demand for 
both long and short period structures [3, 29, 36, 37]. 
More urgently, modern structures in near fault regions might 
have inadequate displacement or ductility capacities because 
near-fault effects are often overlooked or underestimated in 
design codes. In the NZS1170:5 (2004), the near-fault 
amplification factor for elastic design spectra was based on a 
near-fault attenuation model that has been shown to be 
inconsistent when compared to recorded near-fault ground 
motion data [74].  
McVerry et al. [40] cited the lack of near-source records in 
New Zealand strong-motion database for the lack of a 
calibrated attenuation model for spectra generation. A 
preliminary magnitude-dependent response spectra model that 
is significantly different from existing models used in codes 
has also been recently proposed [74]. It is expected that further 
research and analysis of the Canterbury earthquakes seismic 
records will lead to future revision of the NZS1170.5 to better 
account for near-fault effects. 
A limited number of experimental tests of RC structures under 
near-fault high-velocity low-cycles excitation are available 
[12, 64, 67]. These tests generally show a higher transient and 
residual displacement demands on the RC elements. Strain 
concentration and concentration of damage was also observed. 
However, there are inadequate test results to verify or confirm 
whether some of the observed strain concentration, 
concentrated flexural cracking, and reduced strain penetration 
lengths in the 22 February earthquake are consequences of 
near-fault excitation. 
9.12 Soil- Structure Interaction: Integrated design 
approach to avoid liquefaction induced differential 
settlement and tilting 
In the 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake as well 
as the 22 Feb 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake, severe 
widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading were observed 
in the Christchurch and surrounding suburbs. However, 
limited or partial liquefaction manifestation was observed 
within the Christchurch CBD in the 4 September event, while 
severe liquefaction was observed in parts of the Christchurch 
CBD in the 22 February earthquake. 
The severe widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading  
observed in the CBD area following the 22 February event, 
and to a greater extent in many other suburban areas, has led 
to significant lateral movement or differential settlement in the 
building foundation systems, resulting in foundation damage 
and permanent tilting of the structures [26], as shown in 
Figure 72. Variable soil profiles underneath these buildings 
with varying foundation designs are some of the complexities 
resulting in mixed (good and bad) performance of various 
CBD buildings within the same segment of liquefaction-
damaged street.  
  
Figure 72: Liquefaction induced differential settlement 
resulting in significant tilting of mid- to high-rise 
buildings of various foundation and soil details: a) 
Four-storey with shallow foundation; b) Six-storey 
with shallow foundation; c) Two high-rise buildings 
with substantial differential settlement and tilting.  
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Preliminary observations indicate buildings with piled 
foundations generally exhibit less differential settlement and 
liquefaction-induced tilt [26]. High-rise multi-storey buildings 
founded on shallow foundations with significant liquefiable 
soil depth generally exhibited substantial settlements and 
liquefaction-induced tilt.  
In general, the relative extent of damage and 
repair/remediation costs associated to the superstructure and to 
the foundation systems varied significantly. The overall result 
is that the combination (sum of) this damage and repair costs 
is ultimately leading many buildings to be demolished.  
Although soil-structure-interaction, SSI, or soil structure-
foundation-interaction, SSFI, has been recognised for decades 
as a major and very challenging topic in earthquake 
engineering, much more effort is needed to develop and 
provide user-friendly and practical guidelines for the 
practitioner engineers.  
Performance-based seismic design as described in Section 9.4 
can be extended to include combined performance criteria and 
acceptable limit states for the superstructure and foundation-
soil structure.  
9.13 Brittle mesh and beam-elongation effects on 
precast floor diaphragm  
Diaphragm action is a complicated issue as the induced forces 
in the diaphragm can be very high due to the in-plane stiffness 
of the floor and the induced diaphragm forces from beam 
elongation and slab-flange actions.  
The vulnerability of cold-worked wire mesh for diaphragm 
action has been recognised since the mid-2000s, as per the 
DBH Practice Advisory 3 [15] and the Amendments No. 3 to 
NZS3101 in 2004 [47]. The reliance on cold-drawn wire mesh 
for the inertial force transfer between the diaphragm and the 
main lateral-load resisting elements can be very un-
conservative as the required strain can be significantly higher 
than expected. 
As discussed in Section 5.1, the displacement-incompatibility 
of lateral load resisting systems and the precast floor 
diaphragm, arising from the adverse elongation effect of 
expected ductile plastic behaviour of  RC frames [20, 39, 47], 
in conjunction with the use of brittle mesh for topping 
reinforcing can lead to a very vulnerable outcome (as observed 
in the building in Figure 30). 
It is noted the duration and number of inelastic cycle demands 
in the 22 February earthquake is short and limited. A longer 
duration severe earthquake can potentially lead to more severe 
diaphragm failure and perhaps collapse of the floors shown in 
Figure 30. 
As noted in the SESOC report [72], there is a need for simple 
and unified design guidelines for diaphragms, irrespective of 
the material of the primary structural elements. While the 
current practice of using either earthquake-grade “ductile” 
mesh reinforcing or using ductile mild steel reinforcement for 
shear transfer from the diaphragm appears to be performing 
satisfactorily in inspected buildings, the need of thorough 
intrusive inspection of the damaged floors can render the 
building to be uneconomical to repair.  
Alternative design solutions for precast floor diaphragm 
transfer such as mechanical shear key on un-topped floors 
(e.g. USA practice [76]) or un-bonded long tie-back 
reinforcements can be considered and researched for future 
application.  
9.14 IEP Assessment  
The Initial Evaluation Procedure (IEP) Assessment following 
the 2006 NZSEE Guidelines [52] is a widely used seismic 
assessment screening tool in New Zealand. While the IEP 
assessment is an economical and rational framework to screen 
for Earthquake-Prone Buildings (EPB), the 22 February 
earthquake has also highlighted some of its limitations  
The IEP assessment and the 2006 NZSEE Guidelines [52] 
have popularised the concept of Percentage of New Building 
Standards (%NBS) as a measure of seismic vulnerability of 
buildings. However, the level of 33%NBS used in regulations 
to the Building Act 2004 to define an earthquake-prone 
building has been wrongly interpreted as meaning that 
buildings above this level are relatively safe in a major 
earthquake. This is in spite of clear messages to the contrary 
that the legislation was set to cover only the worst of 
buildings. The %NBS score is further misleading if it is 
derived from a very crude IEP assessment (e.g. without any 
structural drawings or site inspection).  
The IEP assessment have highlighted four critical structural 
weaknesses such as plan and vertical irregularity, short 
columns and pounding potential, with each having a similar 
weighted reduction factors (Factors A to D). Some of these 
factors are valid indicators of poor structural performance for 
RC buildings, as evidence of the various structural failures 
which arise from say plan and vertical irregularity discussed in 
the preceding Sections.  
Some factors (e.g. short columns and pounding) are typically 
more relevant to certain typology of buildings such as 
unreinforced masonry buildings. There is little evidence in 
Christchurch which suggests significant damage or structural 
failure of RC buildings due to seismic pounding for example. 
Figure 73 illustrates some of the more common „localised‟ 
damage as a consequence of pounding. However, it is noted 
that experience from overseas earthquakes have shown the 
severe effects of seismic pounding for RC buildings (e.g. in 
Mexico City 1985 earthquake [68]).  
 
Figure 73: Pounding damage was not widely observed. 
However, the use of equal-weighting and a limited list of 
„critical structural weaknesses‟ tend to draw attentions away 
from some other issues that may lead to catastrophic collapse 
and loss of lives. Various critical structural weaknesses as 
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highlighted in this report – such as brittle mesh diaphragm 
reinforcing or a poor diaphragm-to-lateral load resisting 
system, non-ductile pre-1970s RC building detailing, gravity 
columns, non-ductile walls etc. are generally not explicitly 
considered in such assessments. 
The IEP assessment, which essentially is a screening and rapid 
assessment tool, is increasingly used as the „standard‟ entry-
level seismic assessment of existing buildings. It should be 
highlighted that the IEP assessment alone is unlikely to be 
able to capture most of the RC buildings with fatalities in the 
22 February earthquake.  
9.15 Structural drawings repository for emergency 
structural assessment 
The availability of construction drawing of particular classes 
of buildings that are identified as highly vulnerable or 
significant (e.g. higher than 6-storeys) can be very useful to 
the search and rescue efforts. In New Zealand, various local 
territorial authorities have varying policies and timeframes in 
digitising the council records (and building drawings). The 
management of a large volume of data/information that is 
urgently needed in the event of emergency can present 
challenges in establishing building inventory (and drawings 
repository). Such repository within the local territorial 
authorities should be considered as a critical emergency 
resources and high priority.  
10 FINAL REMARKS 
This paper has presented a summary and overview of 
preliminary lessons from our observations of the seismic 
performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 
Christchurch earthquake.  
Due to the concise nature of the paper and relative to the 
amount of information collected and observed, it was not 
possible to discuss all relevant aspects in details. At the time 
of writing, the Royal Commission of Inquiry and various 
investigations on the seismic performance of severely 
damaged and collapsed RC buildings are on-going. Readers 
are encouraged to read the outcomes of the inquiry at the 
Royal Commission website [70]. 
An observational damage report comprising more than 100 
RC Buildings has also been compiled [57] as part of the 
Natural Hazard Platform Recovery Projects.  
The unique and unprecedented series of severe earthquake 
events in Christchurch and the substantial damage observed to 
the older “non-ductile” and also modern and “well” designed 
RC buildings is an invaluable „learning lesson‟ for earthquake 
engineering. It is essential that comprehensive efforts are 
undertaken to further analyse and study the lessons from these 
earthquakes.  
The Canterbury earthquakes have also started the discussion 
for improvement in the building design and the underlying 
performance objectives that will fulfil the expectation of New 
Zealand society of its built environment.  
As with previous major earthquakes around the world, the 
Christchurch earthquakes provide a window of opportunity for 
the New Zealand construction industry to recognise and deal 
with some for the existing vulnerabilities, as well as, to pursue 
a more aggressive approach to minimise the seismic risk of the 
building stock in New Zealand.  
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